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Making Sense of Sense-Enhanced Searches
David E. Steinberg*
INTRODUCTION
During the past decade, federal and state law enforcement
agencies have conducted "sense-enhanced" searches1 with in-
creasing frequency.2 Such sense-enhanced searches range from
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1. This Article uses the term "sense-enhanced search" to describe any
police examination of a person or his property through the use of some
method that provides information not available to unaided seniory percep-
tions. This Article uses the term "physical search" to describe the traditional
police search, which relies on uhaided sensory perceptions.
Others have referred to sense-enhanced searches as "high technology
searches." See, e.g., Gutterman, A Formulation of the Value and Means Mod-
els of the Fourth Amendment in the Age of Technologically Enhanced Surveil-
lance, 39 SYRACUSE L. REV. 647, 650 (1988); Comment, Law Enforcement Use
of High Technology: Does C7osing the Door Matter Anymore?, 24 CAL. W.L.
REV. 83, 84 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, Law Enforcement Use of High Tech-
nology]. Although sense-enhanced searches may rely on sophisticated technol-
ogy, this need not be the case. A police officer perched atop a mountain and
surveying the surrounding land with a cheap pair of binoculars is engaged in
precisely the same type of practice as an officer who views the land from an
airplane using highly sophisticated photographic equipment. Compare Dow
Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 243 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting)
(noting that photographs of a factory complex taken from an airplane revealed
equipment as small as one-half inch in diameter) with United States v.
Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1980) (involving use of high-powered tel-
escope to read labels on containers located in a suspect's apartment, which
were suspected to contain cocaine). See also Amsterdam, Perspectives on the
Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 402 (1974) (arguing that the fourth
amendment should cover police "snooping activities" unaided by sense-enhanc-
ing methods).
2. See, e.g., Thomas, Dogs OKd for School Drug Searches, Chicago Trib-
une, Feb. 23, 1989, § 2, at 3, col. 3; Harrison, Alleged Wiretap Scheme Investi-
gated in Cincinnati, L.A. Times, Jan. 14, 1989, at 1, col. 1; Drogin, Wiretaps:
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familiar methods, such as wiretaps and canine sniffs, to more
recently developed techniques, such as "beeper" monitoring
and aerial surveillance.3
Court decisions determining whether a particular type of
sense-enhanced search requires a warrant have proven chaotic
and unpredictable. 4 A wiretap or "bug" that records telephone
conversations requires a warrant.5 Police, however, may plant
a recording device on an undercover agent or an informant and
record conversations between that individual and a suspect
without a warrant.6 Similarly, a "pen register," which records
Tuning In to Mob Life, L.A. Times, Oct. 23, 1987, at 1, col. 1; Hurst, High-Tech
Pot War, L.A. Times, June 11, 1987, at 3, col. 1; Houston, Pot Growers, State
Police Play Costly Game of Hide and Seek, Chicago Tribune, May 26, 1987, § 2,
at 4, col. 1.
3. The vast array of sense-enhancing devices available to law enforce-
ment officers are described in A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 68-69 (1967);
Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment- The Arrival
of Big Brother?, 3 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 261, 266-69 (1976) [hereinafter Note,
Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment]; see also Sussman,
High Tack: Electronic Eavesdropping, Washington Post Magazine, May 10,
1987, at 35 (describing commercially available listening devices).
4. This confusion to some extent reflects a general lack of coherence in
Supreme Court fourth amendment decisions. See generally Bradley, Two Mod-
els of the Fourth Amendment, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1468-72 (1985) (describing
the fourth amendment as "the Supreme Court's tarbaby: a mass of contradic-
tions and obscurities"); Weinreb, Generalities of the Fourth Amendment, 42 U.
CHI. L. REV. 47, 49-50 (1974) (noting that the Court's fourth amendment juris-
prudence is "a body of doctrine that is unstable and unconvincing").
5. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320-21 (1972);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357-59 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 51 (1967).
In the wake of Berger and Katz, Congress adopted Title III of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1988).
Title III established procedures for the issuance of warrants authorizing elec-
tronic interception.
The Supreme Court has held that all parties to an intercepted conversa-
tion possess fourth amendment standing and may exclude evidence obtained
through a warrantless wiretap. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176-
77 (1969). An individual whose residence phone is tapped possesses standing to
exclude evidence obtained from a warrantless wiretap, even if the resident is
not a party to the intercepted call. Id. Other individuals who are not parties
to an intercepted call lack standing to exclude evidence obtained from a war-
rantless wiretap that violates the fourth amendment. See United States v.
Kahn, 415 U.S. 143, 155-58 (1974).
6. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-54 (1971); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963). Use of a recorder concealed on an inform-
ant to obtain incriminating statements violates an indicted suspect's sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. Maine v. Moulton, 474
U.S. 159, 176-77 (1985); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205-06 (1964).
This sixth amendment prohibition, however, applies only to a recording ob-
tained after a grand jury has indicted the suspect. The use of a concealed re-
[Vol. 74:563
SENSE-ENHANCED SEARCHES
the numbers dialed from a telephone but not the contents of
conversations made from that phone, does not require a
warrant.7
Monitoring a "beeper," a device that police use to track a
suspect's movements, typically does not require a warrant.8 Po-
lice, however, cannot monitor a beeper without a warrant when
the device passes into a constitutionally protected area, such as
a suspect's home.9 Police may conduct a warrantless aerial
search from an airplane or helicopter, even if their search in-
cludes a constitutionally protected area.'0 Police need not ob-
tain a warrant before using a drug-detecting dog to sniff out
concealed narcotics.'1
Several state court opinions suggest a lack of coherence in
these Supreme Court decisions. These state court opinions
have rejected the United States Supreme, Court's sense-en-
hanced search conclusions in defining the warrant require-
ments of state constitutions. 2
corder prior to an indictment does not violate the sixth amendment. Moulton,
474 U.S. at 179-80.
7. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-46 (1979).
8. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1983).
9. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 716-18 (1984). Case law has not
yet established whether a warrant is required only when police monitor a
beeper located in a residence, or whether this warrant requirement might ex-
tend to other protected areas, such as an office. But see 1 W. LAFAVE,.SEARCH
AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 530 (2d ed. 1987) (sug-
gesting "that the underlying principal [of the Karo decision] is by no means
limited to 'the monitoring of a beeper in a private residence' ").
10. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 695-97 (1989); Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 212-15
(1986).
11. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983). A number of other
Supreme Court decisions have approved, with little discussion, the warrantless
use of several types of sense-enhanced searches. See, e.g., United States v.
Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 305 (1987) (holding that the warrantless use of a flashlight
does not violate the fourth amendment); United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109, 122-26 (1984) (upholding the warrantless use of a chemical test to deter-
mine whether a packaged substance was cocaine); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 739-40 (1983) (upholding the warrantless use of a flashlight); United States
v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559. 563 (1927) (concluding that the warrantless use of a
searchlight to illuminate a ship does not violate the fourth amendment).
12. For example, the United States Supreme Court has held that the
fourth amendment does not require police to obtain a warrant before equip-
ping an informant with a concealed recorder, which will tape the informant's
conversations with a suspect. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 751-54
(1971); United States v. Lopez, 373 U.S. 427, 438-39 (1963). In contrast, a
number of state courts have interpreted state constitutions to require that po-
lice obtain a warrant before using a concealed recorder. See, e.g., State v.
Glass, 583 P.2d 872, 881-82 (Alaska 1978), modified, City of Juneau v. Quinto,
1990]
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A large number of scholarly pieces discuss fourth amend-
ment issues raised by each specific type of sense-enhanced
search.1 3 Nevertheless, commentators have made little attempt
to assess the general fourth amendment problems raised by all
sense-enhanced searches, or the appropriate standards for ap-
plying the fourth amendment warrant clause to sense-enhanced
searches. 14
This Article considers when courts should require a war-
rant prior to the initiation of a sense-enhanced search.15 Part I
684 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1984); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 563-68, 227
N.W.2d 511, 514-16, cert denied, 423 U.S. 878 (1975); State v. Brackman, 178
Mont. 105, 116-17, 582 P.2d 1216, 1222 (1978); State v. Ayres, 118 N.H. 90, 91-93,
383 A.2d 87, 88 (1978) (superseded by N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 570-A:2, If(d)
(1986)).
The United States Supreme Court has not read the fourth amendment to
require that police obtain a warrant before installing a pen register. Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-46 (1979). Several state courts have rejected the
reasoning of Smith, and have interpreted state constitutions to proscribe the
warrantless use of pen registers. See, e.g., People v. Sporleder, 666 P.2d 135,
140-41, 144 (Colo. 1983); State v. Thompson, 114 Idaho 746, 748-51, 760 P.2d
1162, 1164-67 (1988); State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 348-50, 450 A.2d 952, 956-58
(1982). See generally Gormley, State Constitutions and Criminal Procedure: A
Primer for the 21st Century, 67 OR. L. REV. 689, 717-20 (1988) (summarizing
state court rejections of the rule of Smith).
13. See, e.g., Fishman, Electronic Tracking Devices and the Fourth
Amendment- Knotts, Karo, and the Questions Still Unanswered, 34 CATH. U.L.
REV. 277 (1985); Gutterman, supra note 1; Comment, Re-examining the Use of
Drug-Detecting Dogs Without Probable Cause, 71 GEo. L.J. 1233 (1983) [here-
inafter Comment, Re-examining the Use of Drug-Detecting Dogs]; Note, Elec-
tronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 3; Note,
United States v. Knotts, "A Traveller's Advisory for 1984," 45 U. Prrr. L. REV.
741 (1984) [hereinafter Note, A Traveller's Advisory for 1984]; Note, Tying Pri-
vacy in Knotts Beeper Monitoring and Collective Fourth Amendment Rights,
71 VA. L. REV. 297 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts; Note,
Fourth Amendment Implications of Aerial Warrantless Surveillance, 17 VAL.
U.L. REv. 309 (1983) [hereinafter Note, Implications of Aerial Surveillance];
Note, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance: A Constitutional Analysis, 35 VAND. L.
REV. 409 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Warrantless Aerial Surveillance].
A number of other works discussing various types of sense-enhanced
searches are cited throughout this Article.
14. The few attempts to analyze a broad array of sense-enhanced search
techniques include, e.g., Gutterman, supra note 1; Note, Police Use of Sense-
Enhancing Devices and the Limits of the Fourth Amendment, 1977 U. ILL.
L.F. 1167 (1977) [hereinafter Note, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices].
15. This Article considers only whether various types of sense-enhanced
searches require a warrant. The Article thus does not consider a number of
other aspects of sense-enhanced searches. For example, the Article does not
discuss whether police use of certain minimally intrusive sense-enhancing de-
vices falls within the definition of a fourth amendment "search," an issue that
has received extensive discussion. See, e.g., Note, Police Use of Sense-Enhanc-
ing Devices, supra note 14, passim; Comment, Re-examining the Use of Drug-
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isolates fourth amendment concerns associated with sense-en-
hanced searches. Part II evaluates concepts employed by the
Supreme Court and lower courts to determine whether a war-
Detecting Dogs, supra note 13, at 1236-43. For the purposes of this Article, any
police use of a sense-enhancing device is presumed to be a fourth amendment
"search." See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 383-84.
This Article also does not consider the proper standard governing police
use of sense-enhanced search techniques that do not require a warrant. Just
as police must have probable cause to suspect an individual of criminal activity
before obtaining a search warrant, police typically must possess probable cause
before undertaking a search exempted from the warrant requirement. See,
e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-27 (1987) (finding that the police must
possess probable cause to invoke the "plain view" exception to the warrant re-
quirement); Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 50-52 (1970) (authorizing a
warrantless search of an automobile when officers possessed probable cause to
suspect criminal conduct); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 768-71 (1966)
(ruling that a blood test used to determine a suspect's blood-alcohol level may
proceed without a warrant when police possess probable cause to suspect ille-
gal intoxication); see also Note, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra
note 14, at 1203 (suggesting that courts should employ a "sliding scale," with
various levels of suspicion sufficient to justify a warrantless police use of dif-
ferent types of sense-enhancing devices); cf. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S.
325, 341-42 (1985) (concluding that reasonableness, rather than probable cause,
is required when school officials conduct a warrantless search of a student).
In some circumstances, when either a criminal act or danger to a police
officer is likely, police may undertake a limited search if they possess a "rea-
sonable fear" of such danger. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (upholding a
warrantless search of the person of a suspect who apparently had planned to
burglarize a store). Finally, police practices that do not constitute a "search or
seizure" are in no way limited by the fourth amendment. See United States v.
Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983) (holding that a sniff of luggage by a drug-
detecting dog does not constitute a "search" limited by the fourth amend-
ment); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (finding that the use of a
pen register to record all telephone numbers dialed from or received by a tele-
phone does not constitute a fourth amendment search).
The approach suggested in this Article also does not apply to those cases
in which police have used a sense-enhanced search as part of a significant in-
trusion of a suspect's body. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
109 S. Ct. 1402, 1415-16 (1989) (upholding warrantless breath, blood, and urine
testing of railway employees for alcohol or drug abuse); Cupp v. Murphy, 412
U.S. 291, 294-96 (1973) (upholding the warrantless scraping of a substance
under the defendant's fingernails, which subsequent tests suggested was a
murder victim's blood); Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 766-72 (concluding that police
could extract a suspect's blood without a warrant to measure the suspect's
blood-alcohol level); cf Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952) (forcing a
suspect to vomit evidence that he had swallowed "shocks the conscience" and
violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). As noted by
the Supreme Court in a case involving an intrusion of a suspect's body: "Limi-
tations on the kinds of property which may be seized under warrant, as dis-
tinct from procedures for search and the permissible scope of search, are not
instructive in this context." Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768. Accordingly, cases in-




rant is required when police use various types of sense-en-
hanced searches. This Part concludes that the current
Supreme Court approach does not address important fourth
amendment concerns, and will continue to produce an inter-
nally inconsistent body of law.
Part III suggests three factors that could be used to deter-
mine whether police must obtain a warrant before conducting a
specific type of sense-enhanced search. Applying these criteria,
the Article concludes that some decisions authorizing warrant-
less sense-enhanced searches are incorrect.
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT CONCERNS RAISED BY
SENSE-ENHANCED SEARCHES
In reviewing sense-enhanced searches, the Supreme Court
usually has proceeded from the premise that such searches are
less intrusive than traditional physical searches. The Court has
reached this conclusion by noting that sense-enhanced searches,
such as the use of a beeper or the viewing of property from an
airplane, do not require the disruption of events or destruction
of property that occurs when police tear apart a residence in
search of evidence.16 In other words, the typical absence of any
physical trespass or handling of property assertedly makes a
sense-enhanced search less of an invasion of privacy, and thus
raises less serious fourth amendment concerns than a tradi-
tional physical search.' 7
16. See California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (upholding a war-
rantless aerial search that "took place within public navigable airspace in a
physically nonintrusive manner" (citation omitted)); United States v. Place,
462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (commenting that a canine sniff "is much less intrusive
than a typical search," in part because the canine sniff does not involve "an
officer's rummaging through the contents of the [suspect's] luggage").
17. See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284-85 (1983); cf.
Granholm, Video Surveillance on Public Streets: The Constitutionality of In-
visible Citizen Searches, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 687, 701-02 (1987) (noting that,
with respect to video surveillance, authorities argue that physical intrusion is
"so minuscule that there can be no constitutional violation").
Lower courts considering the constitutionality of warrantless aerial
searches have reached the same conclusion. These courts have held warrant-
less aerial searches unconstitutional only when the noise and wind caused by
low-flying airplanes or helicopters has disturbed residents. See National Org.
for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen, 608 F. Supp. 945, 957-58
(N.D. Cal. 1985); Commonwealth v. Oglialoro, 547 A.2d 387, 388 (Pa. Super.
1988), appeal granted, 557 A.2d 722 (1989); see also State v. Ainsworth, 95 Or.
App. 240, 246, 770 P.2d 58, 61 (en banc) (holding that warrantless aerial search,
conducted at a low altitude, violated state constitutional provisions), review
granted, 308 Or. 158, 776 P.2d 859 (1989).
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The Court's view of sense-enhanced searches as typically
less intrusive than physical searches is incorrect.18 This section
contends that the secrecy of a sense-enhanced search may both
chill free expression and encourage improper police activities.
This section then examines the similarities between a sense-en-
hanced search and the general warrant, a colonial writ that au-
thorized police to undertake an unrestricted search of a
suspect's property. Finally, this section notes that sense-en-
hanced searches allow for a dangerous amount of police discre-
tion, because these searches eviscerate the traditional
requirement that police identify a particular suspect prior to in-
itiating a search.
A. SECRECY
A certain amount of secrecy is inherent in any police inves-
tigation. Law enforcement officers cannot immediately publish
to the world their suspicion that a certain individual possesses
incriminating evidence, because the suspect would destroy the
evidence, or flee the jurisdiction upon hearing the
announcement.
Traditionally, an individual learns that he is suspected of
criminal activity when police arrive at the door and present a
search warrant.19 Even if the suspect is not in attendance when
police undertake a search of his property, he learns of the phys-
ical search when he returns home and finds his possessions out
of place.
Although a discovery that police have searched his resi-
dence no doubt will prove disconcerting to a suspect, this dis-
covery should provide a certain amount of comfort to other
members of the community. These other residents will realize
that they are not under investigation, and that they may con-
tinue to conduct their affairs without worrying about how their
18. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 288 (1983) (Stevens, J., con-
curring); see also Note, Tracking Katz, Beepers, Privacy, and the Fourth
Amendment, 86 YALE L.J. 1461, 1463, 1505 (1971) [hereinafter Note, Tracking
Katz] (arguing that physical attachment of a beeper "brings electronic tracking
within the Fourth Amendment ... and may intrude on protected rights of
privacy").
19. As a general rule, police must provide residents with notice before en-
tering a dwelling to effect a search or arrest. See Miller v. United States, 357
U.S. 301, 306-14 (1958) (stating that arrest effected in the suspect's home was
unconstitutional when police did not provide the suspect with notice prior to
entering); 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1988) (requiring a federal officer to give "notice of
his authority and purpose" before entering a house); 2 W. LAFAvE, supra note
9, at 270-73 (discussing sources and purposes of notice requirement).
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activities are perceived by law enforcement authorities.20
In the case of a sense-enhanced search, however, the sus-
pect typically receives no notice that police have commenced an
investigation.21 For example, an individual has no way of
knowing whether police have placed a wiretap on his phone
line in a phone company office. 22 Nor can an individual discern
whether an airplane flying overhead is engaged in a typical pri-
vate flight, or is engaged in police surveillance of his property.23
The secrecy of sense-enhanced searches is part of their at-
tractiveness to law enforcement officials. Police can investigate
unlawful conduct without alerting the suspect and causing him
to destroy evidence. Police also can gather evidence without
resorting to a time-consuming and potentially dangerous entry
of a suspect's property.2 4
The secrecy accompanying a sense-enhanced search also in-
volves high costs. 25 Specifically, an individual will not know if
he is under investigation. Accordingly, all members of the com-
munity, law-abiding citizens as well as criminals, may con-
stantly fear ongoing law enforcement surveillance.26
The Supreme Court has recognized the concerns raised by
secret search techniques, noting that such undisclosed searches
20. See United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 319 (1987) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting) (stating that "[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits police activity
which, if left unrestricted... would too heavily burden those who wished to
guard their privacy"); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
321 (1972); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
21. See, e.g., A. WESTIN, supra note 3, at 69-89; Comment, Re-examining
the Use of Drug-Detecting Dogs, supra note 13, at 1244.
22. See Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1196-99 (D.C. Cir. 1979), qff'd
in part, cert. dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516
F.2d 594, 606-07 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
23. Similar problems are raised by the relatively recent development of
physical searches undertaken pursuant to a "covert" search warrant. The cov-
ert warrant authorizes officers to secretly enter and observe conditions at a
specified location. See Note, Covert Searches, 39 STAN. L. REV. 545, 546-49
(1987) [hereinafter Note, Covert Searches].
24. Particularly in drug cases, police conducting a physical search must in-
creasingly contend with a chilling assortment of snares and booby traps. See,
e.g., United States v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439, 1441 (4th Cir. 1985) (describing
marijuana cultivation protected by "ankle and neck-high trip wires, barbed
wire stretched across paths at eye level, pit-falls, steel traps, electric fences,
and guard dogs, such as Doberman Pinshcers"); Carter v. United States, 729
F.2d 935, 937 (8th Cir. 1984) (noting that outside of a marijuana garden, of-
ficers "located two shotguns ... with wires affixed to the triggers").
25. See Weinreb, supra note 4, at 83.
26. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 735 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts, supra note 13, at 318.
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may have a "chilling effect" 27 on first amendment rights.28 Se-
cret searches indeed may reduce an individual's willingness to
express her thoughts.2 9 For example, a political radical may
hesitate to state her views in a phone conversation if she be-
lieves that law enforcement officials are listening through a
wiretap. Similarly, a dissatisfied citizen may decline to attend a
political rally if she fears police will be taking attendance from
an airplane flying overhead.30
Secret police investigatory techniques, however, do not
solely raise a first amendment problem.3 ' The notice accompa-
27. As the Supreme Court has written: "[Ojonstitutional violations may
arise from the deterrent, or 'chilling,' effect of governmental regulations that
fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First Amendment
rights." Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972). See also Philadelphia Newspa-
pers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (stating that "it has long been es-
tablished that the government cannot limit speech protected by the First
Amendment without bearing the burden of showing the restriction is justi-
fied"); Zwickler v. Kwoota, 389 U.S. 241, 252 (1967) (holding that application of
the abstention doctrine to a first amendment claim challenging a state statute
might itself chill the first amendment right); Keyshinian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 601-04 (1967) (discussing potential chilling effect of state teacher
loyalty laws and regulations); L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-
26, at 1010 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing tension between governmental access regu-
lation in media and the first amendment).
28. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313-14 (1972);
see also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that "[p]ermitting governmental access to records on less than
probable cause may thus impede certain forms of political affiliation and jour-
nalistic endeavor that are the hallmark of a truly free society"); United States
v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 787 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding that
"[a]uthority is hardly required to support the proposition that words would be
measured a good deal more carefully and communication inhibited if one sus-
pected his conversations were being transmitted and transcribed").
29. Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Expanded
Vision of the Fourth Amendment Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 720
(1985) (asserting that "[a] lack of informational privacy and the resultant
knowledge that authorities have unrestricted access can only yield inhibition,
self-censorship of behavior, and a corresponding diminution of the ability to
enjoy the benefits of ownership or possession").
30. See Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 702-03 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, supra
note 3, at 297-98 (commenting that "[w]ith the advent of electronic snooping, a
person wishing to assure the privacy of his actions from visual observation will
have no absolute protection").
31. See Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 775 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that "[t]he Fourth Amendment, however, does not protect only
information. It also protects, in its own sometimes-forgotten words, '[t]he
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
... '" (emphasis added)); Hufstedler, Invisible Searches for Intangible Things:
Regulation of Governmental Information Gathering, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1483,
1521 (1979) (stating that "[v]e do not need a sophisticated study or a carefully
1990]
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nying a traditional physical search is consistent with a number
of requirements designed to ensure the publicity of criminal in-
vestigations. Such procedures include the general rule that po-
lice officers must state their basis for a search in a formal and
reviewable warrant application,32 the requirement that the
state specify any criminal charges in a published indictment,33
and the maxim that a judge may not bar the public from a
criminal trial.34
This requirement of publicity contrasts with the secret po-
lice operations of the stereotypical totalitarian state, in which
an individual may be arrested at the whim of the police; tried
on unsupported, vague, or incomprehensible charges; and con-
victed in complete secrecy.35 Limiting the use of secret search
techniques thus ensures more than just freedom of expression.
The public knowledge accompanying a traditional physical
search helps prevent arbitrary government action.36
calibrated scale to tell us that acceptance of invisible searches of our homes is
too high a price for the innocent to pay to seek out the guilty. A common bur-
glar is bad enough, but an invisible governmental burglar is intolerable.");
Note, A Reconsideration of the Katz Expectation of Privacy Test, 76 MICH. L.
REV. 154, 155 (1977) [hereinafter Note, A Reconsideration of Katz].
32. See 2 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 167-84, 206-07.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
34. Although the press is the most frequent challenger of orders barring
the public from a trial, a criminal defendant also possesses a sixth amendment
right to an open trial. See, e.g., Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 44-47 (1984).
35. See, e.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 22, 25-27 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 765 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing); A. WESTIN, supra note 3, at 23; Bacigal, Some Observations and Proposals
on the Nature of the Fourth Amendment, 46 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 529, 559
(1978); Gutterman, supra note 1, at 705.
36. The Court and commentators have agreed that simply relying on law
enforcement departments to respect constitutional rights will not adequately
deter unconstitutional police action. "The historical judgment, which the
Fourth Amendment accepts, is that unreviewed executive discretion may yield
too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evidence and overlook poten-
tial invasions of privacy and protected speech." United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972); see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 356-57 (1967) (noting that the Supreme Court "has never sustained a
search upon the sole ground that officers reasonably expected to find evidence
of a particular crime and voluntarily confined their activities to the least intru-
sive means consistent with that end"); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S.
480, 485-86 (1958) (noting that the purpose of a complaint with respect to an
arrest warrant is to allow a magistrate to determine whether probable cause
exists); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (noting fourth amend-
ment requirement that inferences from evidence be drawn by "neutral and de-
tached" magistrate rather than by officer engaged in "ferreting out crime");
Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 415 (discussing "pervasiveness and discontrol of
police discretion"); Schroeder, Deterring Fourth Amendment Violations: Al-
ternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 GEO. L.J. 1361, 1399-1401 (1981) (dis-
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In the most general sense, the accountability that accompa-
nies a physical search limits police discretion. If a community
learns of too many mistakes or unjustified searches by the po-
lice, the community probably will find other police officers to
handle its law enforcement duties.3 7 Police have an incentive
to possess a sound basis for suspecting criminal activity before
they undertake a traditional physical search.
Such police accountability, however, is absent when the
community never learns of unjustified or errant police
searches, as in the case of secret sense-enhanced searches. 38
Police may prove far less hesitant to engage in questionable, ar-
bitrary, or inappropriate sense-enhanced searches than to un-
dertake an improper physical search.39
Civil damages suits brought by innocent victims of unjusti-
fied searches also may help to ensure police restraint.40 Inno-
cussing non-judicial means of controlling police conduct); Note, Tying Privacy
in Knotts, supra note 13, at 327 (suggesting that "self-restraint is inadequate to
control police conduct amounting to a search").
37. See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 427.
38. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 317-18
(1972) (holding that "[t]he independent check upon executive discretion is not
satisfied, as the Government argues, by 'extremely-limited' post-surveillance
judicial review. Indeed, post-surveillance review would never reach the sur-
veillances which failed to result in prosecutions.").
39. The occasional excessive and indiscriminate use of wiretaps supports
this conclusion. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297,
325-26 (1972); Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1196 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (not-
ing that warrantless wiretap continued for almost 21 months and monitored
more than 600 calls), aff'd in part cert. dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981);
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 599, 606-07 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (discussing six war-
rantless wiretaps that provided "'volumes and volumes' of transcripts of inter-
cepted communications"), cert denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); J. LANDYNSKI,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 220-23, 231-33 (1966).
40. The victim of an unconstitutional search may bring a civil action
under the fourth amendment against any federal officer who conducted that
search. G. M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 359 (1977); Bivens
v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 395-
97 (1971). The victim also may bring suit against the United States Govern-
ment under the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986). When an unconstitutional search is undertaken by state police, the
victim may have an action for trespass, false arrest, false imprisonment, or a
state statutory action. See Schroeder, supra note 36, at 1386.
The deterrent effect of a possible civil damages suit on improper searches
should not be overstated. In fact, a number of factors reduce a victim's chance
of success in a fourth amendment civil damages suit. Among these factors: 1)
The victim may be unaware that she possesses a civil action; 2) Even if the
victim is aware of her right to sue for damages, she may fear police reprisals
and decline to bring suit; 3) The victim may be unable to retain an attorney to
prosecute her action; 4) Police officers may be able to defeat the action by as-
serting a good faith belief in the legality of their search as a defense; 5) Police
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cent suspects may bring such civil suits, however, only if they
are aware of police misconduct.4 1 When police inappropriately
use a secret sense-enhanced search, such as a wiretap or a
beeper, a civil suit is not a real possibility.4 At some point, po-
lice simply will discontinue the search, and the suspect will
never know that police unjustifiedly observed his conduct.4 3
To summarize, the secrecy of sense-enhanced searches
raises serious fourth amendment problems. Such secrecy not
only may chill free expression, but also may encourage arbi-
trary and inappropriate police conduct.
B. GENERAL WARRANTS
The general warrant was a British document authorizing
law enforcement officials to conduct an unlimited search of a
suspect's property.4 Under a general warrant, colonial officials
could use an alleged minor violation as a pretext for ransacking
a citizen's entire home.4
5
officers are likely to appear as more credible witnesses before a trier of fact
than the victim of an improper search, particularly if this victim can be linked
to criminal activity; and 6) The victim of an improper search may be unable to
prove that she suffered any compensable damages as a result of an improper
search. See Schroeder, supra note 36, at 1386-90; see also G. M. Leasing Corp.
v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 359-60 (1977) (addressing remedies sought for
fourth amendment violation); Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 360 (asserting that
fourth amendment civil actions "are seldom maintained, nor are they, as a
practical matter, maintainable").
41. See infra text accompanying notes 101-14.
42. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1985); Loewy, The Fourth
Amendment as a Device for Protecting the Innocent, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1229,
1264 (1983).
43. As Justice Douglas put it:
[D]ue to the clandestine nature of electronic eavesdropping, the
need is acute for placing on the Government the heavy burden to
show that 'exigencies of the situation [make its] course imperative.'
Other abuses, such as the search incident to arrest, have been partly
deterred by the threat of damage actions against offending officers,
the risk of adverse publicity, or the possibility of reform through the
political process. These latter safeguards, however, are ineffective
against lawless wiretapping and 'bugging' of which their victims are
totally unaware.
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 324-25 (1972) (Doug-
las, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
44. N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMEND-
MENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 28-42 (1937).
45. In colonial America, the most common form of general warrant was
the writ of assistance. When colonial officials suspected that an individual had
failed to pay customs duties, the writ of assistance authorized these officials to
search anywhere in the individual's residence or place of business. See, e.g.,
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 328 n.6 (1972) (Doug-
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The Court and commentators have agreed that prohibition
of general warrants was one of the central purposes of the
fourth amendment.46 This disfavor of general warrants is ex-
pressed in the fourth amendment mandate that no warrant
shall issue except those "particularly describing the place ...
and the persons or things to be seized. '47 In other words, police
searching for a gun used in a murder cannot rummage through
a suspect's tax returns or personal address book.48 The police
may search only those places where the gun might be found.49
Reading this particularity requirement as a fourth amend-
ment concern extending beyond the warrant clause, the
Supreme Court has proscribed types of warrantless physical
las, J., concurring); J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 39, at 30-39; N. LASSON, supra
note 44, at 51-55; Comment, Reviving Trespass-Based Search Analysis Under
the Open View Doctrine: Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV.
191, 219-20 (1988) [hereinafter Comment, Reviving Trespass-Based Search
Analysis]. As one commentator observes:
The odious features of writs of assistance were the unbridled discre-
tion given public officials to choose targets of the searches, the arbi-
trary invasion of homes and offices to execute the writs, and the
inability to prevent the searches, to recover the objects seized, or to
receive recompense for injuries suffered from the intrusion.
Hufstedler, supra note 31, at 1487; see also Loewy, supra note 42, at 1236 (not-
ing that "virtually every significant prerevolutionary search or seizure in-
volved a nonspecific or arbitrarily obtained warrant").
46. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84 (1987); Payton v. New York, 445
U.S. 573, 583-85 (1980); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971); N.
LASSON, supra note 44, at 79-105; see also United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S.
452, 464-66 (1932) (discussing nature of searches prohibited by fourth amend-
ment); Comment, Reviving Trespass-Based Search Analysis, supra note 45, at
219 (suggesting that the fourth amendment was enacted "in response to the
abusive use of general warrants against commercial interests").
47. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 741-
43, 747 n.14 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (arguing that warrantless
searches should be permitted only when the ultimate goals of the search
would be compromised by a warrant request); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 467 (1971) (noting fourth amendment goal that searches deemed nec-
essary are limited as much as possible to avoid the evil of the "general war-
rant"); Weinreb, supra note 4, at 72 (arguing that constitutional doctrine
permitting warrantless searches when warrant could practicably be obtained
needlessly deprive citizenry of the benefits of advance determinations).
48. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-28 (1987) (holding that during a
search for a gun, police could not examine the serial numbers on apparently
stolen stereo equipment); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 748-49 (1983) (Stevens,
J., concurring).
49. In the words of the Supreme Court, "[just as probable cause to be-
lieve that a stolen lawnmower may be found in a garage will not support a
warrant to search an upstairs bedroom, probable cause to believe that undocu-
mented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless
search of a suitcase." United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 824 (1982).
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searches that approach a general search.50 The Court, however,
has proven more reluctant to apply the limitations of the par-
ticularity requirement to sense-enhanced searches.
Sense-enhanced searches approximate general searches be-
cause most sense-enhancing devices cannot be confined in the
same manner as a physical search.51 For example, officers con-
ducting an aerial search for a marijuana field cannot focus their
vision solely on the suspected marijuana patch.5 2 They will see
anyone who happens to be outdoors on the suspect's land, any
items of property the suspect has placed outside, and will have
an unrestricted view of adjacent lands.5 3 If the officers possess
sophisticated photographic and enlarging equipment, which in-
vestigators may use in an aerial search without a warrant,s 4 the
police probably will see a good deal more.
50. See, e.g., Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 296-99 (1984) (limiting the
breadth of a warrantless post-fire search); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395
(1978) (finding that "murder scene" exception to the warrant requirement vio-
lates the fourth amendment); cf Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n,
109 S. Ct. 1402, 1417 (1989) (upholding the warrantless use of breath analyzing
tests that "can be used only to ascertain the presence of alcohol or controlled
substances in the bloodstream").
51. See Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment,
supra note 3, at 281; Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts, supra note 13, at 326.
52. See People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d 1302, 1330, 729 P.2d 166, 184, 233 Cal.
Rptr. 2, 19-20 (1986) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (stating that "[e]ven if the officers
wanted to 'focus' their attention only on open fields, it should be obvious that
any such attempt would be futile in a program of systematic, indiscriminate
surveillance of private lands from the air").
53. A federal district court granted a preliminary injunction against vari-
ous unconstitutional law enforcement activities purportedly used in attempts
to discover marijuana cultivation, including the inappropriate use of helicopter
surveillance. National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mul-
len, 608 F. Supp. 945 (N.D. Cal. 1985). In NORML, several Humboldt County,
California, residents filed affidavits complaining that helicopters, authorized to
search for marijuana patches in the open fields, flew to within 100 feet of their
homes, with airborne officers gazing through windows at the residents. Id. at
955-56. Another resident complained that she was frequently "buzzed" by low-
flying helicopters while she bathed in her outdoor shower. Id. at 955.
In light of these practices, the NORML district court issued a preliminary
injunction ordering, among other things: "Defendants are enjoined from using
helicopters for general surveillance purposes, except over the open fields." 1d.
at 965. In light of subsequent Supreme Court decisions upholding warrantless
aerial surveillance, see Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986),
California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986), the Ninth Circuit remanded the
NORML preliminary injunction for reconsideration by the district court. Na-
tional Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen, 796 F.2d 276
(9th Cir. 1986); see also United States v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1438, 1440-41 (4th
Cir. 1985) (discussing broad aerial sweeps in search of marijuana cultivation
conducted in Monroe County, West Virginia).
54. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986).
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Consider the use of a pen register, a device that compiles a
list of all calls dialed from a particular telephone.55 Police may
use the pen register for the purpose of learning if an individual
has talked to suspected drug dealers, or if a suspect has dialed
the residences of potential burglary victims to discover if a
home is empty.56 The pen register, however, cannot be limited
to provide information only about phone numbers that may re-
late to criminal activity. Police will learn of all calls dialed by
the suspect, and thus will discover if the suspect has talked to
the girl next door, the local Alcoholics Anonymous hotline, or
the national Communist Party headquarters.57
In short, sense-enhanced searches normally cannot be as
focused as traditional physical searches. 58 The breadth of infor-
mation disclosed by a sense-enhanced search thus raises a seri-
ous fourth amendment concern.
C. GUILT BY ASSOCIATION
A sense-enhanced search, like a general warrant, provides
police with broad and unfocused information about the particu-
lar suspect being searched. A related problem is that sense-en-
hanced searches give police information about third-parties not
previously suspected of a crime. Sense-enhanced searches thus
55. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744-46 (1979).
56. In addition, police often will use a pen register for the more mundane
task of tracing obscene phone calls. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 736, 742-
43 (1979).
57. A majority of the Court rejected the argument that such a police com-
pilation would raise serious privacy concerns. Noting that some telephone di-
rectories discussed the use of pen registers to deter obscene telephone calls,
the Court wrote: "Although subjective expectations cannot be scientifically
gauged, it is too much to believe that telephone subscribers, under these cir-
cumstances, harbor any general expectation that the numbers they dial will
remain secret." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 736, 743 (1979); cf id at 748
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (stating that most individuals would object to a pen
register compilation listing the telephone numbers that they had dialed, "be-
cause it easily could reveal the identities of the persons and the places called,
and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person's life"). See also 1 W.
LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 507 (criticizing the Court's decisions upholding war-
rantless use of pen registers); Bacigal, supra note 35, at 538 (explaining the
scenario for admissibility of evidence revealing intimate personal details);
Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts, supra note 13, at 322 (suggesting that constant
surveillance would reveal individual's "secrets" and "associational
tendencies").
58. A possible exception to this general rule is the use of a drug-detecting
dog. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706-07 (1983); see also infra text
accompanying notes 263-66 (discussing limited focus of canine sniffs and as-
serting correctness of Place).
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
depart from the requirement that police possess some objective
basis for suspecting an individual of criminal activity before
conducting a search of that individual's person or possessions.
Sense-enhanced searches invite police to conduct arbitrary and
inappropriate investigations into the affairs of individuals, even
though police initially may have no basis for suspecting that
these individuals have committed a crime.
The fourth amendment not only limits the breadth of
information that police may seek in a search, but also limits the
number of individuals whom police may search during their in-
vestigation of a particular crime.59 In other words, police must
have an independent basis for searching any particular person,
and cannot search an individual simply because they find him
in the company of others independently suspected of wrong-
doing.6 0
The principle that police only may search a specific individ-
ual suspected of wrongdoing is illustrated by a 1979 Supreme
Court decision, Ybarra v. 1llinois.61 Based on an informant's
tip, police obtained a warrant to search for heroin allegedly pos-
sessed by "Greg," a bartender at the Aurora Tap Tavern. When
the officers entered the bar in the afternoon, "Greg" apparently
was not present. Nonetheless, police conducted a "pat down"
search of the about ten customers in the bar. The search of
Ventura Ybarra, one of the bar patrons, revealed six foil pack-
ets containing heroin. The Illinois Supreme Court subse-
quently convicted Ybarra of possession of heroin. 62
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that
the search of Ybarra violated the fourth amendment.63 The
Court reached this result because the investigating officers ob-
59. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 39, at 46.
60. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661-63 (1979); United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 882-84 (1975); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 153-54 (1925).
Even when conducting a warrantless search, police typically must possess
some basis for suspecting criminal activity before they may search an individ-
ual or his possessions. See supra note 15. When conducting a search that re-
quires a warrant, police typically must demonstrate the existence of probable
cause to believe that the individual has some connection with unlawful activ-
ity. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (declaring that "no warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause"). But see Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 534-40
(1967) (holding that an administrative warrant, authorizing a search of area
structures for building code violations, may be issued without a showing of
probable cause); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545-46 (1967) (same).
61. 444 U.S. 85 (1979).
62. Id. at 89.
63. Id. at 96.
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tained a warrant only to search the bartender "Greg," and not
bar patrons such as Ybarra. Police must demonstrate probable
cause "particularized with respect to that person," not just
guilt by association with another person or place.
The Court reaffirmed this holding that police may search
only the person or property of the particular suspect specified
in a warrant in Steagald v. United States. 6 5 In Steagald, an in-
formant told police that they could find Ricky Lyons, a federal
fugitive wanted on drug charges, at the residence of Gary Stea-
gald. Police obtained a warrant for the arrest of Lyons, but did
not obtain a search warrant applying to Steagald's house, pre-
sumably because they lacked evidence that Steagald himself
was involved in unlawful activity. Police did not find Lyons at
Steagald's residence, but the officers nonetheless searched the
premises. The search uncovered forty-three pounds of cocaine.
Steagald subsequently was convicted on drug possession
charges.66
As in Ybarra, the Steagald Court reversed the conviction,
holding that the search of Steagald's residence on the basis of
the warrant for the arrest of Lyons violated the fourth amend-
ment.67 The Court was concerned that upholding the convic-
tion "would create a significant potential for abuse" by police.68
An officer with a valid warrant for one person could "search all
the homes of that individual's friends and acquaintances. '69
Ybarra and Steagald stand for the proposition that police
cannot search an individual's person or property solely because
64. Id at 91..
65. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
66. Id. at 207.
67. Id at 213-14.
68. Id. at 215.
69. Id See also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct.
1402, 1416-17 (1989) (recognizing that "[o]ur cases indicate that even a search
that may be performed without a warrant must be based, as a general matter,
on probable cause to believe that the person to be searched has violated the
law"); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (holding that reasonable
grounds for expecting discovery of evidence of misconduct is required to jus-
tify public employer's search of employee's office); Camara v. Municipal Court,
387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) (noting that "in a criminal investigation, the police
may undertake to recover specific stolen or contraband goods," but the "public
interest would hardly justify a sweeping search of an entire city conducted in
the hope that these goods might be found"); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S.
20, 30-31 (1925) (holding that right to conduct warrantless search both of per-
sons lawfully arrested while committing a crime and of site of arrest does not
extend to remote locations).
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that individual has associated with suspected criminals.70 The
fact that police found Ventura Ybarra in the bar tended by
drug-dealing "Greg" did not provide a basis for a search of
Ybarra's person. Similarly, Gary Steagald's residence in a
building that the fugitive Ricky Lyons also may have inhabited
or visited did not give police a basis for searching Steagald's
residence. 71
This rule limiting the scope of police searches not only pro-
tects privacy interests, but also helps to confine police discre-
tion. Police first must articulate some basis for suspecting a
particular person of criminal activity before conducting a
search.72 Under a contrary rule, police working in a high crime
area too easily could justify any search by finding some sus-
pected criminal who had associated with the subject of the
search.73 To demonstrate that such an abuse was not simply a
hypothetical concern, the Steagald Court cited a lower court de-
cision, Lankford v. Gelston,74 in which the Fourth Circuit en-
joined a search of more than 300 residences for two fugitives
not residing in any of these homes.75
70. The holdings in these cases are consistent with first amendment deci-
sions that have invalidated laws restricting an individual's freedom of associa-
tion. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290,
295-300 (1981) (holding that city's imposition of limits on contributions to a
political committee, while imposing no spending limits on individuals acting
alone, contravenes constitutional rights of free association and free speech);
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918-26 (1982) (holding that a
state court could not impose civil liability on a black organization and its mem-
bers for an alleged use of violence during a boycott when most organization
members did not engage in violence); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29
(1963) (finding that state's enforcement of anti-solicitation laws preventing at-
torneys from aiding a group in political and legal attempts to prevent racial
discrimination violated first and fourteenth amendments).
Just as individuals do not receive any less first amendment protection
when they organize in groups or associations, an individual should not receive
any less fourth amendment protection simply because he has associated with
suspected or actual criminals.
71. See Granholm, supra note 17, at 701.
72. See Loewy, supra note 42, at 1239-40.
73. See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 438.
74. 364 F.2d 197, 198 (4th Cir. 1966).
75. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 215 (1981); see also Loya v.
INS, 583 F.2d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 1978) (suit alleging that Immigration and
Naturalization Service officers "had used illegal 'dragnet' tactics and had
stopped and detained over 11,000 persons solely on the basis of 'Latin-Ameri-
can' appearance"); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 942-43, 967 (D.C. Cir.)
(finding that plaintiffs may bring a class action alleging that more than 10,000
arrests, made in connection with an anti-war demonstration, violated the
fourth amendment), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); Spring Garden United
Neighbors, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 614 F. Supp. 1350, 1351-52 (E.D. Pa.
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The breadth of information revealed by sense-enhanced
searches inevitably will result in police examination of third-
parties not independently suspected of any wrongdoing.76 For
example, police listening to a wiretap not only will learn about
the suspect whose telephone lines they are monitoring, but also
will discover information about anyone talking to the suspect
on the telephone, including individuals whom police previously
may not have associated with criminal activity.77
Similarly, police surveying a suspect's property from an air-
plane not only will learn whether this particular suspect is cul-
tivating marijuana, but also cannot help but observe whether
illegal activities are taking place on adjacent land.7 8
In fact, police might even use sense-enhanced surveillance
to "leapfrog" from one suspect to another. For example, con-
sider Matt, a suspected drug dealer. To confirm their suspi-
cions of Matt's unlawful activities, police wiretap Matt's
1985) (discussing police "sweep" of a Philadelphia neighborhood, during which
officers detained at least 100 individuals).
76. See Granholm, supra note 17, at 699-700 (discussing the use of surveil-
lance cameras on public streets); Note, Tracking Katz, supra note 18, at 1505-
06 (stating that "[w]here the property to which the beeper is attached... is
likely to change hands or is subject to use by persons other than those under
investigation, the danger of unwarranted intrusions into the privacy of third
parties may be too great to permit a warrant"); Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts,
supra note 13, at 311-12 (discussing use of beeper surveillance to monitor sus-
pect's automobile travels).
77. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 n.14
(1972) (noting that the average wiretap in 1970 "involved 44 people and 655
conversations"); Hufstedler, supra note 31, at 1513 (asserting that "unless the
person subjected to scrutiny is addicted to soliloquy and telephonic mono-
logues, conversations of others unknown in advance will be captured as well.
Recording can be selective, but interception cannot. The choice is necessarily
left to the interceptor, and not to the court.").
78. See National Org. for Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML) v. Mullen,
608 F. Supp. 945, 955-56 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (discussing the virtually unrestricted
surveillance by government helicopters purportedly employed in search of ma-
rijuana cultivation); see also State v. Bridges, 513 A.2d 1365 (Me. 1986). In
Bridges, Maine undercover agents had arranged to purchase marijuana from
Nelson and Henry Geel. Prior to the purchase, police flying in an airplane fol-
lowed Nelson Geel's pickup truck to a farm where Defendant Edmund Bridges
was working. The airborne police then watched Bridges and Nelson Geel
drive to defendant Horace Moore's residence, where Nelson Geel, Bridges, and
Moore loaded "objects" into Nelson Geel's pickup truck. Id. at 1366.
Other officers arrested Nelson and Henry Geel when they delivered three
boxes of hashish to the undercover agents. Bridges and Moore subsequently
were indicted for participating in a conspiracy to distribute hashish. Id& at
1367. The Bridges court upheld the constitutionality of the warrantless aerial
surveillance that had led police to the previously unknown conspirators
Bridges and Moore. Id. at 1367-68.
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
telephone. From the recorded conversations, officers learn of
information that implicates Bob, a regular caller, in the sale of
parts from stolen cars. Based on this information, police wire-
tap Bob's telephone to learn who buys the stolen auto parts
from Bob. From the new wiretap, police learn that Bob's girl-
friend Melinda may be cheating on her taxes, and so on. Under
such reasoning, police might use information from a single
wiretap as an eventual justification for tapping almost any tele-
phone line.79
In short, law enforcement officers may employ sense-en-
hanced searches to uncover information about third parties not
previously suspected of criminal activity. Supreme Court deci-
sions holding that police may conduct physical searches only of
specific, previously identified individuals support limitations on
the use of sense-enhanced searches.
D. SUMMARY
The preceding discussion asserts that sense-enhanced
searches raise at least three distinct fourth amendment con-
cerns. First, the secrecy of a sense-enhanced search may both
chill free expression and facilitate police abuses. Second, sense-
enhanced searches reveal broad and unfocused information
about a suspect, contrary to the fourth amendment's particular-
ity clause, which authorizes police to conduct only narrow
searches for predetermined types of evidence. Third, sense-en-
hanced searches allow police to conduct surveillance of previ-
79. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 326 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that "[e]ven the most innocent and random
caller who uses or telephones into a tapped line can become a flagged number
in the Government's data bank"); see also Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192,
1198 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (discussing FBI wiretap of private telephone line purport-
edly to investigate suspected "leaks" of classified information, but which also
provided valuable political information unrelated to the investigation), aff'd in
part, cert dismissed in part, 452 U.S. 713 (1981).
This same reasoning would apply to most other types of sense-enhanced
searches. Assume police fly over Matt's land in hopes of spotting marijuana
cultivation. The officers see no evidence of such cultivation, but they do see
some indications of marijuana growing on Bob's property 50 miles away. A
few days later, the officers fly over Bob's property. Their suspicions about the
illegal crop on Bob's property were wrong, but now they see evidence of mari-
juana growing on Melinda's property, 25 miles away. See Izzard v. State, 10
Ark. App. 265, 267-69, 663 S.W.2d 192, 193-94 (1984) (upholding warrantless ae-
rial search that revealed the defendants' marijuana field, discovered during an
unrelated search for an airplane); Goehring v. State, 627 S.W.2d 159, 160, 162
(Tex. Crim. App. 1982) (upholding a warrantless aerial search undertaken by
police attempting to locate two suspects, which resulted in the inadvertent dis-
covery of a marijuana field).
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ously unidentified third-parties, in contrast with the traditional
fourth amendment requirement that police must possess some
objective basis to suspect an individual of wrongdoing before in-
itiating a search. Although all sense-enhanced searches raise
these concerns, different types of sense-enhanced searches may
implicate each concern to a different extent. For example, a
wiretap, which records all conversations passing over a tele-
phone line, provides officers with more extensive information
about a suspect than a pen register, which merely records the
numbers dialed from a particular telephone.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not focused on
these three different fourth amendment concerns in determin-
ing whether a particular type of sense-enhanced search should
require a warrant. Instead, the Court has relied on a variety of
distinctions and analogies in applying the warrant clause to
sense-enhanced searches. As discussed in the next section, the
Court's approach has resulted in irreconcilable precedents and
conflicting lower court decisions.
II. SUPREME COURT ANALYSIS OF SENSE-ENHANCED
SEARCHES
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S SENSE-ENHANCED SEARCH
ANALYSIS
Since the Supreme Court's seminal decision in Katz v.
United States,80 analysis of fourth amendment issues assertedly
has focused on whether a particular search violated a suspect's
reasonable expectation of privacy.81 At least in applying the
warrant clause to sense-enhanced searches, however, the
Supreme Court has found the "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" concept too ephemeral to provide a workable frame-
work.8 2 The Court instead has relied on four more tangible
80. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
81. See e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1985); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525-26 (1984); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177
(1984).
82. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (discussing limits
on the usefulness of the Katz test); see also Bacigal, supra note 35, at 539-40
(discussing ambiguity in application of Katz approach to governmental activi-
ties not constituting physical trespass); Note, A Reconsideration of Katz, supra
note 31, at 157 (noting Court's recognition of the possibility that under Katz,
government could vitiate the right to privacy simply by eliminating expecta-
tions of privacy); infra text accompanying notes 85-90 (discussing the evolu-
tion of fourth amendment jurisprudence in theory and in practice). Compare
California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628-30 (1988) (holding that defend-
ants possessed no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash left outdoors in
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concepts: 1) Physical trespass; 2) The visual/aural distinction;
3) Plain view analogies; and 4) Implicit consent.83
This section concludes that these concepts neither provide
a consistent method for analyzing sense-enhanced searches, nor
address the fourth amendment concerns raised by such
searches. The section also notes the confusion faced by lower
courts in sense-enhanced search cases, and discusses lower
court opinions that have considered two types of warrantless
sense-enhanced searches not yet evaluated by the Supreme
Court. This section concludes that the limited viability of the
concepts employed by the Supreme Court, together with the
Court's varying reliance on each of these concepts, has resulted
in unpredictable and inconsistent decisions.
1. Physical Trespass
Prior to the seminal decision in Katz v. United States,8 4 the
Supreme Court embraced the rule that only a search involving
a physical trespass into a constitutionally protected area re-
quired a warrant.8 5 In Katz, the Court wrote explicitly that it
no longer would decide fourth amendment cases on the basis of
physical trespass. 86 In his Katz concurring opinion, Justice
John Harlan added a test that subsequent decisions have cited
as the touchstone for determining whether a particular search
requires a warrant.8 7 Under Justice Harlan's formulation, po-
lice must obtain a warrant prior to a search if two requirements
are met: "[F]irst that a person have exhibited an actual (subjec-
opaque bags) with id at 1632-34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that a resi-
dent's expectation of privacy with respect to the contents of her trash is rea-
sonable and deserves fourth amendment protection).
83. See infra text accompanying notes 84-191.
84. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
85. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (upholding the
warrantless use of wiretaps, because such searches did not involve a physical
trespass); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924); Amsterdam, supra
note 1, at 357; Note, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra note 14, at
1169; Note, Tracking Katz, supra note 18, at 1469.
86. "[O]nce it is recognized that the Fourth Amendment protects people
- and not simply 'areas' - against unreasonable searches and seizures, it be-
comes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence
or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure." Katz, 389 U.S. at
353; see also Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 701 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(discussing Katz); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313
(1972) (noting Katz Court's refusal to limit fourth amendment protection to
physical trespass); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 393-94 (1971) (same).
87. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 211 (1986).
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tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "88
Perhaps the Katz Court should be faulted for an exces-
sively ambitious attempt to revise fourth amendment law,8 9 but
for whatever reason, courts remain likely to invalidate only
those warrantless searches that involve a physical trespass into
a constitutionally protected area.9 0 For example, the presence
88. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361.
89. A number of commentators have criticized the Katz test as ambiguous,
suspect to result-oriented manipulation, and providing only ephemeral protec-
tion for fourth amendment rights. See, e.g., Gutterman, supra note 1, at 665-
77; Note, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra note 14, at 1171; Note,
A Reconsideration of Katz, supra note 31, at 171-72; Note, Tracking Katz,
supra note 18, at 1473-77.
90. The importance of physical trespass in determining whether police
must obtain a search warrant is illustrated most clearly by the Court's holding
thattsearches conducted in "the open fields" do not require a warrant. Oliver
v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181 (1984). In Oliver, the Court upheld a war-
rantless search of a suspect's farmland, on which he was cultivating marijuana.
Id. at 173, 181. The suspect's regular posting of "No Trespassing" signs, and
construction of a locked gate at the main entrance to the farm did not alter
the Court's conclusion that the suspect lacked any "reasonable expectation of
privacy" on his farmland. Id. at 173-74.
In upholding the constitutionality of warrantless searches in the open
fields, the Court wrote that the warrant clause typically applies in three con-
texts: 1) Searches of a residence and the surrounding "curtilage," id. at 178; 2)
Searches of offices and commercial buildings, id. at 178 n.8; and 3) Searches of
a suspect's person, id. at 179 n.10. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353
(1967) (holding warrantless wiretap of telephone in public telephone booth un-
constitutional). See also Oliver, 466 U.S. at 185 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (not-
ing tension between the majority Oliver opinion and Katz); Bacigal, supra note
35, at 538 (noting dicta in Katz recognizing that privacy may be constitutionally
protected in public places); Bradley, supra note 4, at 1479 (emphasizing arbi-
trariness of distinction between Oliver's fenced field and Katz's telephone
booth); Gutterman, supra note 1, at 689-90 (comparing Oliver and Katz).
The Court reaffirmed Oliver in United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).
Dunn held that a barn located within 60 yards of a dwelling fell within the
open fields, and that the warrantless search of the barn with a flashlight thus
was constitutional. Id at 301-02, 305; see also United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972) (noting that "physical entry of the home is
the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment is di-
rected"); Hufstedler, supra note 31, at 1504, 1511 (discussing cases holding that
fourth amendment protects neither bank records nor mail covers based on
property concepts); Tomkovicz, supra note 29, at 659 n.61 (noting that "[i]n
many of the cases in which the lack or negligible extent of an intrusion has
contributed to rejection of a fourth amendment claim, the courts' references
have clearly been to the physical quality of the intrusion. These references
have sometimes been explicit."); id. at 694-95 (noting continuing attachment to
property and intrusion notions in post-Katz era); Note, Tracking Katz, supra
note 18, at 1478-80 (asserting that the Court developed Katz privacy analysis as
a supplement to traditional property analysis); Comment, Reviving Trespass-
Based Search Analysis, supra note 45, at 228 (asserting that Dow Chemical ef-
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or absence of such a trespass seems to be the only way to recon-
cile the Supreme Court's decisions on beeper monitoring. In
United States v. Knotts,91 the Court upheld the warrantless
monitoring of a beeper that had traveled in the defendant's car,
where he enjoyed less protection than in his residence.92 Con-
versely, in United States v. Karo,93 the Court invalidated the
warrantless monitoring of a beeper that the defendants had
carried into a residence94 - the core example of a constitution-
ally protected area.95 As in Knotts, the Court also relied on the
absence of a trespass into a constitutionally protected area in
upholding the warrantless use of a pen register.96
The Court's reliance on physical trespass as determining
the necessity of a warrant has received two general criticisms
fectively overruled Katz, by holding that warrantless aerial surveillance with-
out a physical trespass is constitutional). 0
91. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
92. Id. at 285. The Supreme Court has held that a search of the interior of
an automobile, unlike the search of a residence, does not require a warrant.
See California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 390-94 (1985); Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42, 51 (1970). Police often may conduct a warrantless search of passengers
and containers located within an automobile. Compare New York v. Belton,
453 U.S. 454, 460-61 (1981) (upholding constitutionality of contemporaneous
search of automobile as incident to lawful custodial arrest of automobile occu-
pant) with Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 766 (1979) (holding that, absent
exigent circumstances, police may not conduct a warrantless search of luggage
taken from an automobile). For a further discussion of the complex rules gov-
erning searches of automobiles, see Katz, Automobile Searches and Dimin-
ished Expectations in the Warrant Clause, 19 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 557 (1982).
93. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
94. Id at 714.
95. See, e.g., Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 748-49 (1984); Steagald v.
United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211-12 (1981); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
590 (1980). But cf Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 871-72 (1987) (upholding
a warrantless search of a probationer's home, undertaken in compliance with
"reasonable" state regulations governing searches of individuals on probation).
96. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741 (1979) (reasoning that "[s]ince the
pen register was installed... at the telephone company's central offices, peti-
tioner obviously cannot claim that his 'property' was invaded or that police in-
truded into a 'constitutionally protected area' "); see also Tomkovicz, supra
note 29, at 720 (asserting that "if one seeks to enjoy the benefits of property
ownership or possession by permitting others onto her land, by not turning
her realty into a fortress, the government's access to information about her
life and conduct on such property will be constitutionally uncontrolled").
Although the Court has viewed the presence of a physical trespass as per-
haps the most important factor in determining whether a search requires a
warrant, the Justices occasionally have upheld some warrantless searches in-
volving a trespass into a constitutionally-protected area. See United States v.
White, 401 U.S. 745, 747, 753 (1971) (upholding the warrantless use of a radio
transmitter concealed on a government informant, even though one of the re-
corded conversations occurred in the defendant's home).
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- labeled here as the entitlements criticism and the cultural
criticism. The entitlements criticism provides that a fourth
amendment focus on physical trespass improperly allows a sus-
pect's wealth to determine the extent of his fourth amendment
rights.97 While the owner of a spacious, enclosed mansion holds
an extensive area that police cannot search without a war-
rant,98 a tenement resident possesses little space protected from
a warrantless police search.99
The cultural criticism provides that basing the warrant re-
quirement on the location of a search shows little sensitivity to
individuals whose important activities, for cultural or idiosyn-
cractic reasons, take place outside of a constitutionally pro-
tected area, such as a home or office. Requiring a warrant prior
to a physical trespass of a residence provides relatively broad
protection for traditional family interactions. If an individual's
interpersonal relationships occur primarily in street-corner
97. See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 404.
98. The fourth amendment protection from unreasonable searches not
only applies to the inside of a house, but also to the "curtilage." United States
v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 300 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180
(1984). Courts have defined curtilage "as 'an area of domestic use immediately
surrounding a dwelling and usually but not always fenced in with a dwell-
ing.'" United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 993 n.1 (4th Cir. 1981) (quoting
United States v. LaBerge, 267 F. Supp. 686, 692 (D. Md. 1967)).
Although a warrantless search of a residence is presumptively unconstitu-
tional, a warrantless search of the curtilage apparently sometimes is permissi-
ble. Compare California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-14 (1986) (upholding
warrantless surveillance from an airplane of a suspect's backyard) with Van
Dyke, 643 F.2d at 994 (holding unconstitutional warrantless physical search
conducted in a fenced yard 150 feet from a house).
99. Bacigal, supra note 35, at 541-42 & nn.94-95; Comment, Law Enforce-
ment Use of High Technology, supra note 1, at 92; Note, A Reconsideration of
Katz, supra note 31, at 170; Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment- A Reason-
able Expectation of Privacy, or, A Man's Home Is His Fort, 23 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 63 (1974) [hereinafter Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment], stating
that:
we have the specter of a fourth amendment which protects any man
who retreats into his home to be free from an unreasonable intrusion.
Any man, that is, who is wealthy enough to afford a windowless,
soundproof house, built on an extensive area of land, and surrounded
by high fences, and a man who is willing to live the life of a hermit,
staying inside his house at all times, prepared to take affirmative ac-
tion to counter any new technological methods of intrusion with
which the government might be equipped.
Md at 72; see also id at 89 (asserting that fourth amendment protections are
not conditioned on having wealth sufficient to build a "police-proof fortress").
Some Supreme Court decisions have declared that an individual's entitle-
ments cannot affect the exercise of certain constitutional rights. See Harper v.
Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 668 (1966) (holding that assessment
of a mandatory poll tax of $1.50 on voters violated the equal protection clause).
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meetings or at outdoor gatherings and rallies, however, a tres-
pass-based application of the fourth amendment's warrant re-
quirement provides little protection.100
Whatever the validity of limiting the warrant requirement
to physical searches that involve a trespass, three additional ar-
guments suggest that the application of the warrant clause to
sense-enhanced searches should not turn on whether a trespass
has occurred. First, the power of sense-enhanced search de-
vices renders the precise location from which police effectuate
a search increasingly irrelevant. 01 As a practical matter, a sus-
pect will not care how police examine an object located in the
suspect's backyard: police may view the object with their un-
aided vision from one foot away, use a high-powered telescope
stationed a mile away, or employ sophisticated photographic
equipment from an airplane. 0 2 In each case, the police gain
the same information about the suspect. 0 3 Residents no longer
receive significant protection simply because police cannot
enter onto their property without a warrant. 0 4
Second, requiring a warrant only for those sense-enhanced
100. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 192 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing); see also Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 405, 438 (discussing the reduced
fourth amendment protection accorded to tenement and ghetto dwellers);
Yackle, The Burger Court and the Fourth Amendment, 26 U. KAN. L. REV. 335,
410-11 (1978) (criticizing Supreme Court decisions finding diminished expecta-
tion of privacy in automobiles based on the Court's perception of American
life).
101. Fishman, supra note 13, at 301; Weinreb, supra note 4, at 83-84; Note,
Katz and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 99, at 69-72.
102. See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 243 (1986) (Powell,
J., dissenting); see also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 715 (1984) (reason-
ing that surreptitious police monitoring of beeper carried into a residence is
equivalent to surreptitious physical entry into the residence); Oliver v. United
States, 466 U.S. 170, 175-77 (1984) (finding no infringement of a reasonable pri-
vacy expectation when police trespassed on suspect's property and observed il-
legal marijuana fields, despite suspect's efforts of concealment).
103. Similarly, it makes little difference whether police overhear conversa-
tions by placing a glass to a wall outside of an apartment, or by placing a wire-
tap at telephone company offices located miles away. See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 353, 359 (1967); Gutterman, supra note 1, at 686-87.
104. See also Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 699 (1989) (O'Connor, J., con-
curring) (finding unreasonable defendant's expectation that curtilage was pro-
tected from naked-eye aerial observation from a helicopter flying at an
altitude of 400 feet). See generally J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 39, at 198 (dis-
cussing erosion of individual privacy due to modem technological develop-
ments, particularly in the area of eavesdropping); A. WESTIN, supra note 3, at
70-78 (discussing various devices and techniques employed in visual and aerial
surveillance); Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amend-
ment, supra note 3, at 263 (discussing impact of sophisticated electronic devices
on traditional zone of privacy).
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searches that involve a physical trespass could induce police to
adopt less focused search techniques.10 5 For example, assume a
police officer suspects that a homeowner is cultivating mari-
juana in a greenhouse attached to the homeowner's residence.
Assume also that the officer has two initial choices for confirm-
ing his suspicions. The officer may conduct a physical search by
entering onto the suspect's property and viewing the green-
house - an investigation that would require a warrant. Before
conducting that type of search, however, the officer must con-
sider all the difficulties of the warrant process, including the
tedious preparation of a warrant application, the possibility that
a neutral magistrate will deny the application,10 6 and the possi-
105. In other words, police will possess an incentive to adopt search tech-
niques that provide officers both with a broad variety of information about a
particular suspect, and with information about individuals not previously sus-
pected of criminal activity. See supra text accompanying notes 59-79 (discuss-
ing unconstitutionality of basing searches solely on guilt by association).
106. The extent to which the warrant process actually imposes a significant
burden on police is highly debatable. Critics of the warrant process assert that
the magistrate's or judge's review often amounts to little more than a rubber
stamp of any warrant application prepared by police. Reasons cited for the
typical willingness of judicial officers to approve warrant applications include:
1) The lack of adversary challenge to warrant applications, 2) The ability of
police to "magistrate shop" and seek warrants from those judicial officers least
likely to question the application, 3) The large volume of applications
presented to each judicial officer, making detailed review of any single applica-
tion impossible, and 4) The past experience of many magistrates as law en-
forcement employees, rendering these magistrates highly receptive to police
explanations. See, e.g., R. VAN DUIZEND, L. SUTTON & C. CARTER, THE
SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS: PRECONCEPTIONS, PERCEPTIONS, PRACTICES 46-65,
104-21 (1985); Finer, Gates, Leon, And the Compromise of Adjudicative Fair-
ness (Part II): Of Aggressive Majoritarianism, Willful Deafness, and the New
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 34 CLEv. ST. L. REV. 199, 225-31 (1986)
(discussing pervasive willingness of judges and magistrates to approve warrant
applications); see also Miller & Tiffany, Prosecutor Dominance of the Warrant
Decision: A Study of Current Practices, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 1 (discussing issu-
ance of arrest warrants).
Even assuming that magistrates critically reviewed all warrant applica-
tions, police officers in many jurisdictions may apply for an oral warrant, is-
sued after a magistrate has spoken with an officer by telephone. See Marek,
Telephonic Search Warrants: A New Equation for Exigent Circumstances, 27
CLEv. ST. L. REv. 35, 35 (1978); Note, Oral Search Warrants: A New Standard'
of Warrant Availability, 21 UCLA L. REv. 691, 694 (1973) [hereinafter Note,
Oral Search Warrants]. The preparation and approval of such oral warrants
typically takes less than one hour. Id. at 694 n.23; see also Bradley, supra note
4, at 1492-93 & n.11 (endorsing the regular use of oral warrants).
On the other hand, the persistent police practice of conducting warrant-
less searches suggests that the warrant process does impose some burdens on
police. Police often have conducted warrantless searches even when probable
cause for the issuance of a warrant appeared clearly established, and when any
delay that accompanied the warrant application was unlikely to result in a de-
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bility that the subject of the search may attack the propriety of
the search 0 7 either at an ensuing criminal trial,10 8 or in a civil
suit.
1 0 9
On the other hand, the officer may conduct an aerial
search of the suspect's property. 1 0 Such a search would not re-
struction of evidence, the disappearance of a suspect, or some other harm. See,
e.g., California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 404 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that "[t]he officers plainly had probable cause to arrest the respondent and
search the motor home, and on this record, it is inexplicable why they es-
chewed the safe harbor of a warrant"); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719
(1984) (finding that officers could have secured a search warrant without first
deploying beeper in residence); Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287, 296-99 (1984)
(limiting the breadth of a warrantless post-fire search of private residence);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978) (holding that the warrantless
search of a murder scene was unconstitutional). These repeated warrantless
searches have occurred despite an explicit Supreme Court preference for
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 913-14 (1984); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236-37 (1983); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102, 109 (1965); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 110-11 (1964); cf Skinner v.
Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1414 (1989) (stating that the
fourth amendment proscribes only unreasonable searches, judged by balancing
intrusion on individual's fourth amendment interests against legitimate gov-
ernmental interests); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985) (upholding
a warrantless search of a high school student, because the warrant require-
ment is "unsuited to the school environment").
107. An officer must demonstrate that she possesses "probable cause" to
suspect the presence of criminal activity or evidence before obtaining a search
warrant. The Supreme Court has held that a magistrate's determination of
whether such probable cause exists should be based on a "totality-of-the-cir-
cumstances analysis." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983). The Court
stated:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical,
common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth
in the affidavit before him, including the 'veracity' and 'basis of
knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.
Id-
108. A defendant may suppress the evidence revealed by a search pursuant
to a warrant when he proves that police adopted a "deliberate falsehood or...
[a] reckless disregard for the truth" in preparing the warrant application, and
when the remaining content of the warrant application was insufficient "to
support a finding of probable cause." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171-72
(1978). On the other hand, a defendant cannot exclude evidence discovered
pursuant to a warrant obtained and issued in "good faith," but later found to
lack probable cause or to contain material errors. United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 911-13 (1984); see also Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 349-50, 356-57
(1987) (stating that a defendant cannot exclude evidence obtained in reason-
able reliance on a state statute authorizing warrantless searches, which a court
later declared unconstitutional).
109. See supra text accompanying notes 40-43.
110. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (up-
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quire a warrant and the accompanying procedural steps neces-
sary to obtain the warrant. Nor must the officer compile
evidence showing probable cause to conduct the search - evi-
dence that the reviewing magistrate may find insufficient. The
officer can make an independent determination of probable
cause.'' If this determination proves wrong, the officer can
simply discontinue her investigation of the suspect.
Police thus will have an incentive to pursue investigations
through a sense-enhanced search not involving entry onto a
suspect's property, rather than a traditional physical search re-
quiring such entry. With this incentive, however, police are en-
couraged to rely on searches that provide broad rather than
specific information. For example, police conducting a physical
search that requires an entry onto the hypothetical suspect's
property might limit their observations to the suspicious green-
house. Officers conducting an aerial search will have no means
of limiting their view. The aerial search not only subjects all of
a suspect's exposed property to law enforcement observation,
but also throws open nearby land to police surveillance.1 2
Third, application of the warrant clause only to cases in-
cluding a physical trespass encourages police to use secretive
search techniques. As discussed above, police will have an in-
centive to use search techniques not requiring a physical tres-
pass, because only searches accompanied by a physical trespass
will require a warrant. Searches conducted without any intru-
sion into the area under surveillance, however, will be the most
difficult for a suspect to detect, and such searches thus raise se-
rious fourth amendment concerns.113 Accordingly, it seems in-
appropriate to require a warrant only in cases of physical
trespass, because such a requirement encourages the use of
sense-enhanced searches entirely removed from the location
under surveillance." 4
holding legality of government agency's warrantless use of aerial photography
to gain information about industrial plant); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
215 (1986) (upholding a warrantless, naked-eye aerial observation of a back-
yard within the curtilage of a home from an altitude of 1000 feet).
111. See 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 9, at 552-54.
112. Comment, A Privacy-Based Analysis for Warrantless Aerial Surveil-
lance Cases, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1767, 1786 (1987) [hereinafter Comment, War-
rantless Aerial Surveillance Cases].
113. See supra text accompanying notes 19-43.
114. See Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 99, at 69-70.
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2. The Visual/Aural Distinction
As a general rule, the Court will not require a warrant
when a sense-enhancing search technique expands the range or
type of information available to an officer's vision. In contrast,
the Court has applied a much stricter fourth amendment re-
view to search techniques that augment an officer's hearing.11 5
The decision in United States v. United States District
Court116 illustrates the Court's general rule requiring a war-
rant when a search technique enhances an officer's unaided
hearing. In United States District Court, the Attorney General
had authorized the use of warrantless wiretaps to investigate
Lawrence Robert Plamondon, who eventually was charged
with the dynamite bombing of a Central Intelligence Agency
office in Ann Arbor, Michigan.11 7 Noting the Court's adoption
of a general rule requiring a warrant prior to the use of a wire-
tap," 8 the government argued that a "domestic security" excep-
tion justified the warrantless wiretaps used, to overhear
Plamondon's conversations. 1 9
In rejecting this argument, the United States District Court
opinion relied heavily on the ability of the Plamondon wiretaps
to reveal verbal conversations, thus implicating first amend-
ment as well as fourth amendment rights.1 20 Justice Lewis
Powell expressed the majority's concerns that aural-enhanced
searches, or "official eavesdropping," could "deter vigorous citi-
zen dissent and discussion of Government action in private con-
versation."' 21  Consistent with this reasoning, the Supreme
Court typically has invalidated the warrantless use of tech-
niques that reproduce conversations, such as wiretapping i22
The Court more favorably views search techniques that
115. See Fishman, supra note 13, at 325.
116. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
117. IM at 299-300.
118. IM at 308 (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v.
New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967)).
119. Id at 301-03.
120. Id- at 313.
121. Id- at 314.
122. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 323-
24 (1972) (holding unconstitutional the warrantless use of a wiretap); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 358-59 (1967) (same); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.
41, 51 (1967) (same); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 509-11 (1961)
(holding unconstitutional the warrantless use of a "spike-mike" implanted in
the wall of a residence); cf. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 747, 753 (1971)




rely on an enhancement of visual sensations. 2 3 For example,
in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States 2 4 the Court affirmed the
warrantless use of sophisticated and sensitive photographic
equipment in an aerial search of a 2000 acre industrial com-
plex.125 In upholding this search for evidence of environmental
violations, the Court explicitly noted the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency's use of an aerial search that replicated only vis-
ual impressions, rather than aural sensations. 2 6 The Court
concluded that "[ain electronic device [used] to penetrate walls
or windows so as to hear and record confidential discussions of
chemical formulae or other trade secrets would raise very dif-
ferent and far more serious questions.'2 7
As a practical matter, the visual/aural distinction is of lim-
ited analytic value because only a relatively small number of
sense-enhanced searches fall within the category of either a vi-
sion-enhancing or aural-enhancing search. For example, a
"beeper," through which police trace the movements of sus-
pects, does not actually replicate either visual or aural sensa-
tions.128 In upholding the warrantless beeper monitoring
employed in United States v. Knotts,29 the Supreme Court con-
cluded that unenhanced visual surveillance could have revealed
the location of a container of chemicals, used to manufacture il-
legal amphetamines, which police instead had tracked by moni-
123. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 697 (1989) (upholding a war-
rantless search conducted from a helicopter); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (upholding a warrantless search conducted from an
airplane); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (same).
In upholding the warrantless use of a pen register that recorded a list of
all telephone numbers dialed by a suspect, the Court noted that "[t]hese de-
vices do not hear sound." Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 741, 745-46 (1979)
(quoting United States v. New York Tel. Co., 434 U.S. 159, 167 (1977)); see also
Note, Telescopes, Binoculars, and the Fourth Amendment, 67 CORNELL L. REV.
379, 389 (1982) (discussing cases upholding government's warrantless use of
electronic tracking devices); supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing use and judicial treatment of pen registers).
124. 476 U.S. 227 (1986).
125. Id. at 239.
126. The Court stated: "Here, [the Environmental Protection Agency] was
not employing some unique sensory device that, for example, could penetrate
the walls of buildings and record conversations in Dow's plants, offices, or lab-
oratories, but rather a conventional, albeit precise, commercial camera com-
monly used in mapmaking." Id at 238.
127. Id. at 239.
128. Gutterman, supra note 1, at 699-701.
129. 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983); cf United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714
(1984) (holding unconstitutional warrantless police monitoring of a beeper lo-
cated within a defendant's residence).
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toring a beeper.1 30 The defendant in Knotts used public roads
and the Court asserted that "he voluntarily conveyed [his
course of travel] to anyone who wanted to look."131
Justice William Rehnquist's conclusion in Knotts that
traditional police visual surveillance could have provided the
same information that the police collected from monitoring the
beeper is simply wrong. After obtaining the chemical container
in which police had installed the beeper, one of the defendants
in Knotts drove to a co-defendant's house where he transferred
the container and beeper to the co-defendant's car.1 32 The de-
fendants then drove the auto carrying the container to a se-
cluded cabin.133 Even if officers had followed the defendant
who purchased the chemicals for every mile of his journey,
traditional visual surveillance would not have revealed where
the suggestive chemical container came to rest: in the purchas-
ing defendant's car, in the co-defendant's house, in the co-de-
fendant's car, or in the cabin.'3 The beeper did not simply
enhance visual police surveillance, but instead provided a quali-
tatively different type of information than would have been
available through the use of any unaided sense impression.
135
The visual/aural distinction also is of limited utility when
applied to other types of sense-enhanced searches. Neither a
canine sniff1 36 nor the monitoring of telephone lines with a pen
register 137 constitutes a visual or aural investigatory tech-
130. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282; see Note, Telescopes, Binoculars, and the
Fourth Amendment, supra note 123, at 389.
131. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281.
132. Id. at 278.
133. Id.
134. 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 523. In fact, even monitoring the
beeper from the ground would not have revealed the location of the chemicals.
At one point, police needed the use of a helicopter to discern the location of
the beeper. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 278.
135. This point is to some extent conceded by Justice Rehnquist in his
Knotts majority opinion:
Admittedly, because of the failure of the visual surveillance, the
beeper enabled the law enforcement officials in this case to ascertain
the ultimate resting place of the chloroform when they would not
have been able to do so had they relied solely on their naked eyes.
But scientific enhancement of this sort raises no constitutional issues
which visual surveillance would not also raise.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983); see also United States v. Karo,
468 U.S. 705, 733 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (concluding that "[i]n this case,
the beeper enabled the agents to learn facts that were not exposed to public
view").
136. See United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 699 (1983).
137. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 736 n.1 (1979).
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niques.'3 8 The nonconformity of sense-enhancing devices to
any visual/aural distinction is understandable. These devices
are attractive to police precisely because they provide informa-
tion not available through the use of unaided sensory percep-
tions. This nonconformity, however, renders the visual/aural
distinction of limited utility in determining whether a particu-
lar type of sense-enhanced search requires a warrant.
The visual/aural distinction not only is difficult to apply,
but also is of questionable validity. 139 The Court has limited
aural-enhanced searches because eavesdropping devices moni-
tor conversations involving communication and expression,
thus implicating first amendment concerns. In rejecting a
fourth amendment exception that would have authorized war-
rantless wiretaps when the federal government perceived a
threat to domestic security, the Supreme Court, in United
States v. United States District Court,140 wrote: "The price of
lawful public dissent must not be a dread of subjection to an
unchecked surveillance power .... For private dissent, no less
than open public discourse, is essential to our free society."'.
The United States District Court opinion expresses a valid
concern that unrestrained eavesdropping could produce a "chil-
ling effect" on expression protected by the first amendment.
Nonetheless, the Court's limiting of this concern to searches
that involve aural monitoring of communications is inappropri-
ate. Government also may curtail free expression not only by
"aural" monitoring of communications, but also by "visual"
monitoring of a speaker's activities.142 For example, consider a
very small and unpopular political party, a group engaging in
precisely the type of discussion that the first amendment was
designed to protect. 43 Given the group's unpopularity, group
members probably will prefer to hold political meetings in the
138. Comment, Re-examining the Use of Drug-Detecting Dogs, supra note
13, at 1242; Note, Katz and Dogs: Canine Sniff Inspections and the Fourth
Amendment, 44 LA. L. REV. 1093, 1104 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Katz and
Dogs].
139. See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 13, at 325; Note, Katz and Dogs, supra
note 138, at 1101.
140. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
141. Md at 314.
142. See Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment,
supra note 3, at 286, 288, 294 (suggesting that a concealed camera actually
would constitute a greater invasion of privacy than a wiretap); Note,
Telescopes, Binoculars, and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 123, at 391.
143. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 108 S. Ct. 1916, 1925 (1988)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting); Boos v. Barry, 108 S. Ct. 1157, 1162 (1988); A.
MEIKELJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GoVERNMENT 88-89
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security of some isolated location. The principal privacy con-
cern of party members may not be the precise content of what
is said at the meeting, but instead could be their association
with the unpopular party.'"
Unfortunately, given the Court's disinclination to place any
limits on vision-augmenting search devices, group members will
have little assurance that their presence at the meeting remains
undisclosed. Government officials could track group attend-
ance through the warrantless use of beepers attached to sus-
pected members' cars, or through a warrantless aerial survey of
an outdoor meeting area.145 Under these circumstances, know-
ledge that government officials have not "bugged" the party's
secret meeting ground with listening devices probably would
prove of limited comfort to attending members.146 The use of
devices that enhance police officers' visual faculties thus may
produce the same chill on free speech as the use of devices en-
hancing the officers' aural sensations.147 For this reason, the
aural/visual distinction apparently employed by the Supreme
Court does not seem plausible.
3. Plain View Analogies
Supreme Court decisions have established a "plain view"
exception to the warrant requirement. Under this exception,
when unanticipated evidence lying in an officer's plain view is
discovered during a proper search for other items, the officer
may seize the unanticipated evidence.148 The Court has rea-
(1948); see also Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969) (per curiam) (re-
versing conviction that rested on television films of rally).
144. A. WESTIN, supra note 3, at 69 (holding that "[a] major aspect of pri-
vacy for individuals . . . is the ability to move anonymously from time to
time"); Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts, supra note 13, at 322 (concluding that
"constant surveillance of a person's movements could, over time, reveal associ-
ational tendencies as thoroughly as a membership list").
145. With sophisticated photography and enlarging equipment used from
an airborne airplane or helicopter, officers also could record the license plate
numbers on automobiles parked outside the hypothetical group's meeting site.
See Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 231 (1986).
146. See Granholm, supra note 17, at 708-09; Tomkovicz, supra note 29, at
719 (noting that "[w]e might take advantage of the out-of-doors by sunning
ourselves in various states of undress, by speaking our minds to no one in par-
ticular, or by meeting with others. None of these possible exploitations of the
opportunities that secluded lands afford are criminal.").
147. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 751 (1979) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (commenting that "Im]any individuals, including members of unpopular
political organizations or journalists with confidential sources, may legiti-
mately wish to avoid disclosure of personal contacts").
148. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971) (plurality opin-
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soned that requiring an officer to obtain a warrant before con-
fiscating evidence lying at his feet would impose a pointless
administrative burden, and, in the case of a discovered weapon,
could prove dangerous.149
The Supreme Court has attempted to justify warrantless
sense-enhanced searches by analogizing these searches to a
physical search falling within the plain view exception.150 This
argument, related to the aural/visual distinction discussed
above,15 1 contends that a contested sense-enhanced search tech-
nique merely replicates a plain view search. Because such a
plain view search could proceed without a warrant, so the argu-
ment goes, the similar sense-enhanced search should not re-
quire a warrant.1 5 2
For example, in California v. Ciraolo,153 the Supreme
Court sanctioned the use of an airplane from which officers,
without a warrant, observed marijuana illegally cultivated in a
suspect's backyard. In upholding this warrantless aerial search,
the Court asserted that a plain view of the backyard containing
the plants was available to the public.1  The Court thus con-
cluded that police do not need a warrant to observe what is visi-
ble to the naked eye from public airspace. s55 The fact that the
Ciraolo suspect had built a ten foot high fence around his back-
yard did not change the Court's conclusion. The Court stated
that "a 10-foot fence might not shield these plants from the
eyes of a citizen or a policeman perched on top of a truck or a
ion); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 781 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Compare Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947) (holding that officers
may seize illegal property when entry on premises is legal and the search is
valid) with id, at 186 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (asserting that authority to
arrest gives no corresponding authority to search premises and seize property).
149. Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S.
730, 739 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466-67 (1971) (plural-
ity opinion); see also Weinreb, supra note 4, at 79 (noting officer's responsibil-
ity to protect himself and effect arrest).
150. Gutterman, supra note 1, at 673-75; Note, Constitutional Limitations
on the Use of Canines to Detect Crime, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 973, 976-82 (1976)
[hereinafter Note, Constitutional Limitations on the Use of Canines]; Com-
ment, Reviving Trespass-Based Search Analysis, supra note 45, at 205; Com-
ment, Re-examining the Use of Drug Detecting Dogs, supra note 13, at 1240-44.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 115-47.
152. See Granholm, supra note 17, at 696; Note, Electronic Visual Surveil-
lance and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 3, at 271.
153. 476 U.S. 207 (1986).
154. "Any member of the public flying in this airspace who glanced down
could have seen everything that these officers observed." Id. at 213-14.




The Court used similar reasoning to uphold warrantless
monitoring with a beeper, concealed in a chemical container
and transported by car, in United States v. Knotts.157 In up-
holding this warrantless use of a beeper, which led the police to
a drug-manufacturing laboratory, the Court emphasized that
the beeper was "augmenting the sensory faculties" of the po-
lice, and that simple visual surveillance "would have sufficed to
reveal" all the relevant facts. 158
The Court's attempt to analogize sense-enhanced searches
to searches falling within the plain view exception is suscep-
tible to attack on a number of grounds. First, the analogy sug-
gests that, under the plain view exception, a warrant is not
required whenever an officer spots incriminating evidence.1 5 9
The plain view exception is not nearly this broad. The excep-
tion applies only when the investigating officer's "access to the
object has some prior Fourth Amendment justification .... 1,60
A previously-obtained search warrant typically has fulfilled
this independent justification,161 and courts frequently have ap-
156. Id. at 211; see also Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696 (1989) (conclud-
ing officers legally could view marijuana from the air without a warrant).
157. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
158. Id. at 282.
159. See Note, Katz and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 99, at 84 (stat-
ing that "many of the cases invoking the plain view doctrine - including a
number of cases which do not do so by name - cannot comply with the re-
quirement that police officers have a right to be in the areas from which they
obtained their view").
160. Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983); accord Texas v. Brown,
460 U.S. 730, 738 (1983); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466-67
(1971) (plurality opinion); Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child
of the Great "Search Incident" Geography Battle, 26 MERCER L. REV. 1047,
1096 (1975) (stating that "[t]he hardest conceptual problem attending the plain
view doctrine is to grasp that it is not a universal statement of the right of a
policeman to seize after seeing something in open view; it is rather a limited
statement of that right in one of several instances - following a valid intru-
sion"); Note, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra note 14, at 1173.
161. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plurality opin-
ion); Moylan, supra note 160, at 1081-84; Note, Tracking Katz, supra note 18, at
1498 n.162.
The Court's initial formulation of the plain view exception required not
only that an officer possess an independent justification for a plain view
search, but also that the officer's discovery of the evidence in plain view be
"inadvertent." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 469 (1971) (plurality
opinion). It is possible that police no longer must meet this inadvertence re-
quirement to come within the plain view exception to the warrant clause. For
example, the Supreme Court has invoked the plain view exception to uphold
an officer's warrantless seizure of a heroin-filled balloon and plastic vials con-
taining heroin from a suspect's car. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 743 (1983)
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plied the plain view exception when officers have stumbled
onto evidence beyond the scope of a valid warrant.1 62 The
Supreme Court, however, has stated repeatedly that a police of-
ficer who spots incriminating evidence by peering into a resi-
dence from a public street cannot snatch the evidence without a
warrant by invoking the plain view exception.163 If the plain
view exception applied in such cases it would swallow the gen-
eral rule requiring a warrant.'L 4
(stating that "[w]hatever may be the final disposition of the 'inadvertence' ele-
ment of 'plain view,' it clearly was no bar to the seizure here"); see also id. at
744 (White, J., concurring) (urging rejection of the inadvertence requirement);
United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 118-19 (1984) (holding valid a federal
agent's reexamination of a package after accidental opening by private ship-
pers); Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 5 (1982) (holding that an officer's
warrantless observation of a marijuana pipe and seeds in a dormitory room fell
within the plain view exception); Comment, Law Enkforcement Use of High
Technology, supra note 1, at 102 n.112 (noting that "accidental surveillance" of
illegal activity in a private backyard may fall within the plain view exception).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Grubczak, 793 F.2d 458, 461 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that an officer could seize a case lying in plain view that contained
lock-picking equipment when the case was discovered during an attempt to ex-
ecute an arrest warrant); United States v. McDonald, 723 F.2d 1288, 1295-96
(7th Cir. 1983) (holding that officers could seize mail discovered in plain view
when a warrant authorized officers to search for cocaine and proof of resi-
dency), cert denied, 466 U.S. 977 (1984); United States v. Mason, 523 F.2d 1122,
1126-27 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding that officers could seize keys to a stolen auto,
discovered during an attempt to execute two arrest warrants); see also Moylan,
supra note 160, at 1075 (noting that plain view doctrine allows officers, in the
course of a valid search, to seize other incriminating evidence); cf Arizona v.
Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326-29 (1987) (holding that officers could not move stolen
stereo equipment to check the serial numbers on the equipment without a
warrant when the officers had entered an apartment to search for a gun).
163. See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1987); Illinois v. An-
dreas, 463 U.S. 765, 779 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that "under the
'plain-view' doctrine, the fact that a person displays incriminating evidence in
his living room window (or allows it to pass through customs inspection) is not
enough by itself to authorize a search and seizure of that evidence"); Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 468 (1971) (plurality opinion) (noting that
"plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evi-
dence"); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1932); 1 W. LAFAVE, supra
note 9, at 324; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (holding
that the ability to see a suspect through the glass of a public telephone booth
did not render a warrantless wiretap of the public telephone constitutional).
Some lower courts have reached a contrary result, upholding the warrant-
less seizure of evidence spotted by officers peering into a structure through a
window. See United States v. Hanrahan, 442 F.2d 649, 653-54 (7th Cir. 1971)
(upholding officer's use of a flashlight to peer into a garage window from an
adjacent sidewalk); Ponce v. Craven, 409 F.2d 621, 625 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. de-
nied, 397 U.S. 1012 (1970).
164. See Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 327 (1987); Coolidge v. New Hamp-
shire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (plurality opinion); see also Comment, Reviving
Trespass-Based Search Analysis, supra note 45, at 215-16 (noting that many ju-
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A second objection to the Court's plain view analogy is that
this argument assumes its conclusion.165 As discussed above,
166
the Court has upheld warrantless sense-enhanced searches by
reasoning that an officer's unaided vision could have revealed
the relevant information disclosed by the sense-enhanced
search. For example, officers could have observed the mari-
juana plants in Ciraolo by driving past the suspect's backyard in
a two-level bus, and officers could have found the illegal drugs
in Knotts simply by trailing the suspect's car. If this assertion is
correct, however, then why didn't police drive past the Ciraolo
backyard in a high bus or truck,167 or simply tail the car in
Knotts? Instead of taking these simple measures, police went
to the difficulty and expense of using an airplane or a beeper.
The only sensible reason for this choice is that an unaided
visual search would not have replicated the sense-enhanced
search.168 As di!scussed above, the officers in Knotts could not
have followed the trail of the suggestive chemicals simply
through visual surveillance of the suspect's activity.
169
Although the officers might have seen the Ciraolo suspect's
marijuana plants from the top-of a two-level bus, a quick scan
from a moving bus might not have resulted in an identification
of the plants, and if the bus remained near the fence for some
time, the suspect might have become aware of the surveil-
lance.170 Thus, the Court's conclusion that the Ciraolo and
Knotts searches were equivalent to an unaided viewing of the
suspect's activities is incorrect as a practical matter.171
dicial opinions and commentaries have rejected an overly expansive plain view
standard).
165. Gutterman, supra note 1, at 674.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 150-58.
167. Further, the police could have placed a ladder next to the backyard
fence.
168. Granholm, supra note 17, at 697.
169. See supra text accompanying notes 128-35.
170. Use of the bus also might have alerted the suspect to the officers' in-
vestigation, causing him to destroy the plants before they were seized as evi-
dence. The secret aerial search undertaken by police in Ciraolo thus probably
would be more effective than the hypothetical suggested by the Court. The se-
crecy of aerial searches, however, also raises serious fourth amendment con-
cerns. See supra text accompanying notes 19-43.
171. See Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 702-03 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 522 (noting that "[it is this assumed equiv-
alence between mere 'visual surveillance' and 'scientific enhancement' in
Knotts which is troublesome. Under the Katz expectation-of-privacy test, the
two investigative techniques simply are not the same."); Granholm, supra note
17, at 709 (discussing the different effect of public surveillance by a uniformed
police officer, and public surveillance through a hidden video camera); Coin-
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More importantly, whether unaided visual surveillance
would have revealed the same information as a sense-enhanced
search should be irrelevant. The fact that an unintrusive
search could have revealed evidence should not serve to legiti-
mize a more intrusive search that police actually conducted.172
For example, under the reasoning used by the Court in Ciraolo
and Knotts, a warrantless ransacking of a home would be con-
stitutional if a search conducted pursuant to a specific warrant
could have revealed the same information. The obvious re-
sponse to such reasoning is that whether a search pursuant to a
warrant would have produced the same evidence as the ran-
sacking is irrelevant. A search pursuant to a warrant was not
undertaken. Instead, police conducted a warrantless general
search, and such a search violates the fourth amendment.
By the same token, a warrantless sense-enhanced search is
not justified simply because a search falling within the plain
view exception might have produced the same evidence as the
sense-enhanced search. The Court should judge the validity of
a warrantless sense-enhanced search by the characteristics of
the search method actually used, and not by the characteristics
of another type of search that police might have used as a
substitute.
4. Implicit Consent
In some cases, the Court has reasoned that a suspect's im-
plicit consent justifies a warrantless sense-enhanced search. 7 3
This reliance on implicit consent apparently arises out of the
established rule that a warrant is not required after a suspect's
explicit consent to a search.'7 4 For example, in Washington v.
Chrisman, 75 a police officer observed marijuana seeds and a
rent, Reviving Trespass-Based Search Analysis, supra note 45, at 225; Note, A
Reconsideration of Katz, supra note 31, at 179; Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts,
supra note 13, at 311; Note, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra note
14, at 1186, 1188-89.
172. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
173. Bacigal, supra note 35, at 537; Uviller, Evidence From the Mind of the
Criminal Suspect: A Reconsideration of the Current Rules of Access and Re-
straint, 87 CoLUM. L. REv. 1137, 1199 (1987) (noting that "[b]ecause infiltration
is normally accomplished by procuring the unwitting invitation or at least the
sufferance of the suspect, it has traditionally been treated as a simple case of
consent, obviating any fourth amendment problems").
174. See, e.g., Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1982); United
States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557-60 (1980); Schenckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1973); Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 358.
175. 455 U.S. 1 (1982).
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marijuana pipe in "plain view," after he entered a student dor-
mitory room with the permission of one of the residents.176
The students then voluntarily turned over three bags of mari-
juana to the officer.177 The students also consented to a search
of the dormitory room, which revealed more marijuana as well
as LSD. All of these evidence-gathering activities were under-
taken without a warrant. 78 The Washington Court upheld the
warrantless search of the dormitory room because the students
had consented to the search. 79
In an apparent extension of decisions such as Washington,
some courts have held that a warrantless sense-enhanced
search was justified because the suspect implicitly consented to
the use of a sense-enhancing device. The Supreme Court par-
ticularly emphasized this implicit consent rationale in United
States v. TVhite. °80 In White, officers concealed a recording de-
vice on a government informant. The suspect had no knowl-
edge of his acquaintance's status as an informant, or of the
hidden recording device. The device recorded four conversa-
tions between the suspect and the informant.' 8 ' The govern-
ment did not obtain a warrant before employing the concealed
recorder.
In an opinion upholding this warrantless search, Justice
Byron White suggested that the suspect implicitly consented to
the recording of his conversations:
Inescapably, one contemplating illegal activities must realize and
risk that his companions may be reporting to the police. If he suffi-
ciently doubts their trustworthiness, the association will very proba-
bly end or never materialize. But if he has no doubts, or allays them,
or risks what doubt he has, the risk is his. In terms of what his course
will be, what he will or will not do or say, we are unpersuaded that he
would distinguish between probable informers on the one hand and
probable informers with transmitters on the other. Given the possi-
bility or probability that one of his colleagues is cooperating with the
police, it is only speculation to assert that the defendant's utterances
would be substantially different or his sense of security any less if he
also thought it possible that the suspected colleague is wired for
sound.18
2
176. Id at 3-4.
177. Id at 4.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 9-10. See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557-59
(1980) (holding no warrant was required when the suspect had consented to a
search of her person).
180. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
181. Id. at 747.
182. Id. at 752; cf. Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985) (holding that
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The Court also relied on a suspect's implicit consent to up-
hold the warrantless use of a pen register - a device that
records all numbers dialed from a particular phone. In Smith
v. Maryland,8 3 the Court validated the warrantless use of a
pen register to identify a burglar who subsequently made
"threatening and obscene phone calls" to the victim of his ear-
lier burglary. 8 4 In support of its conclusion, the Court sug-
gested that all individuals who make phone calls implicitly
consent to the use of a pen register. The Court noted that the
introductory sections of some telephone directories allude to
the possible use of pen registers. 8 5
The implicit consent rationale of White and Smith is en-
tirely conclusory.18 6 These decisions provide no basis for the as-
sertion that the suspects implicitly consented to a sense-
enhanced search. Consent might have been a reasonable infer-
ence in White, for example, if the informant had shown the
suspect a sign reading, "I am an informant wired with a hidden
recording device," and the suspect nonetheless embarked on his
defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel was violated by admission at
trial of incriminating statements defendant made to attorney who wore re-
cording device); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 207 (1964) (holding that
defendant's own incriminating statements, obtained from transmitter installed
in defendant's car by confederate, could not be used against defendant at trial).
183. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
184. I& at 737.
185. The Court stated:
Although most people may be oblivious to a pen register's eso-
teric functions, they presumably have some awareness of one common
use: To aid in the identification of persons making annoying or ob-
scene [telephone] calls .... Most phone books tell subscribers, on a
page entitled 'Consumer Information,' that the company 'can fre-
quently help in identifying to the authorities the origin of unwelcome
and troublesome calls.' . . . Telephone users, in sum, typically know
that they must convey numerical information to the phone company;
that the phone company has facilities for recording this information;
and that the phone company does in fact record the information for a
variety of legitimate business purposes.
I&i at 742-43 (citations omitted). The Court also has suggested that a suspect's
implicit consent supports the use of an aerial search. See, e.g., Florida v. Riley,
109 S. Ct. 693, 696 (1989) (stating that "[b]ecause the sides and roof of [the de-
fendant's] greenhouse were left partially open, however, what was growing in
the greenhouse was subject to viewing from the air.... [Defendant] Riley
could not reasonably have expected that his greenhouse was protected from
public or official observation from a helicopter had it been flying within the
navigable airspace for fixed-wing aircraft."); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
213-14 (1986); see also California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1627 (1988)
(stating that by placing objects in a trash can located outside of a residence,
the resident implicitly consents to an examination of those items).
186. See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 407; Bacigal, supra note 35, at 544-45,
553-54; Uviller, supra note 173, at 1200.
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incriminating conversation. The Court relies on a fiction of
consent, based on the notion that a suspect knew there was a
possibility of surveillance. This fiction is equally applicable in
wiretap cases, however, in which the Court requires a war-
rant. 8 7 Indeed, the Court's implied consent reasoning logically
leads to the conclusion that warrants never are necessary. 188 A
court could hold that a suspect implicitly consented to any form
of search, and that the search thus does not require a warrant.
Such reasoning, however, would render the warrant clause
meaningless.
The Court's implicit consent decisions thus lack any factual
support for the conclusion that the defendant somehow con-
sented to a search. The decisions rely on the assumption that
Americans accept an Orwellian regime of constant eavesdrop-
ping as the current state of affairs. Ironically, the Court seems
blinded to the fact the Court itself can significantly influence
the validity of this assumption, depending on how it decides
this implied consent issue. Allowing warrantless use of pen
registers makes telephone users more likely to expect eaves-
dropping, and thus circularly provides a basis for implicit con-
sent. Conversely, proscribing pen registers would decrease the
likelihood of implicit consent.
Because of this circularity, implicit consent is not a viable
means of distinguishing those sense-enhanced searches that re-
quire a warrant from those that do not. If the White defendant
implicitly consented to a tape recording of his statements by
speaking to his acquaintance, then courts similarly should hold
that a suspect implicitly consents to a wiretapping of his con-
versations, whenever he dials a telephone number. 89 This con-
clusion, however, is inconsistent with settled precedent. 9 0
In short, implicit consent is a manipulable conclusion that a
court may use to uphold any warrantless sense-enhanced
187. See infra note 190.
188. But see Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 749 (1979) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting) (stating that "even assuming, as I do not, that individuals 'typically
know' that a phone company monitors calls for internal reasons .... it does not
follow that they expect this information to be made available to the public in
general or the government in particular"). See also Alschuler, Interpersonal
Privacy and the Fourth Amendment, 4 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 1, 29 (1983) (distin-
guishing pen register from human operator); Uviller, supra note 173, at 1207
(discussing Supreme Court's treatment of pen register).
189. Bacigal, supra note 35, at 554.
190. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972);




search. This concept is of little analytical value in determining
the types of sense-enhanced searches that should require a
warrant.
191
B. CONFUSION IN THE LOWER COURTS: Two ATTEMPTED
APPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT'S SENSE-
ENHANCED SEARCH ANALYSIS
Given the limited utility of the Supreme Court's warrant
analysis in sense-enhanced search cases, one might anticipate
significant confusion in the lower courts. Such confusion in-
deed exists, and may be responsible for the Court's frequent
consideration of sense-enhanced searches.
The following section considers two types of warrantless
sense-enhanced searches that continue to divide the lower
courts: 1) The viewing of a protected area with a telescope or
binoculars; and 2) The use of fluorescent powder to connect a
suspect to incriminating evidence. The diverse results and con-
clusory analysis of cases discussing these warrantless searches
illustrate the difficulties faced by lower courts in attempting to
apply the Supreme Court's warrant analysis to sense-enhanced
search cases.
1. Viewing a Protected Area With a Telescope or Binoculars
A recurrent problem arising in the lower courts involves
whether an officer, situated in a public place, must obtain a
warrant before viewing the inside of a residence or office
through a telescope or binoculars. 92 The sense-enhanced
search distinctions employed by the Supreme Court strongly
suggest that the Justices would not require a warrant. 93 Use
191. This Article thus treats the implicit consent rationale differently from
the other Supreme Court sense-enhanced search distinctions. This Article
does not reach a general conclusion on the validity of the physical trespass or
the plain view doctrines, but only concludes that these doctrines should not
apply to analysis of sense-enhanced searches. Conversely, this Article con-
cludes that the implicit consent rationale is entirely unworkable and should be
abandoned.
192. See generally Note, Telescopes, Binoculars, and the Fourth Amend-
ment, supra note 123, at 379-80 (suggesting that police use of telescopes and
binoculars to observe activities beyond the range of the "naked eye" violates
an individual's expectation of privacy).
193. Dicta in two Supreme Court cases decided well before Katz provide
some support for the proposition that such a warrantless use of binoculars or a
telescope is permissible. In one case the Court upheld the warrantless use of a
radio transmitter to overhear a conversation between a suspect and an under-
cover agent. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747, 753 (1952). In support of
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of a telescope or binoculars enhances a visual, rather than an
aural sensation, and the surveillance might be analogized to a
"plain view" search.194 A court also might reason that the sus-
pect implicitly consented to a viewing by leaving an opening
through which officers could observe the inside of a residence
or office. In addition, the binocular or telescope viewing would
not involve a physical trespass into a constitutionally protected
area.
195
On the basis of this analysis, most lower courts have up-
held the warrantless viewing of a home or office through binoc-
ulars or a telescope.196 Some lower courts, however, have
its conclusion, the Court wrote: "The use of bifocals, field glasses or the tele-
scope to magnify the object of a witness's vision is not a forbidden search." Id
at 754. In an even earlier decision, the Court upheld the use of a searchlight
trained by the Coast Guard on a vessel at sea. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S.
559, 563 (1927). In reaching this result, the Court wrote that "[s]uch use of a
searchlight is comparable to the use of a marine glass or field glass. It is not
prohibited by the Constitution." Id
Neither On Lee nor Lee involved police use of a telescope or binoculars to
peer into a home or office. At least one case has questioned the continued va-
lidity of the language in these cases after the Katz decision. See United States
v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 1980).
194. See supra text accompanying notes 115-72.
195. Courts routinely have upheld the warrantless use of binoculars and
telescopes to observe public places. See, e.g., United States v. Allen, 633 F.2d
1282, 1291 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 833 (1981); United States v.
Minton, 488 F.2d 37, 42 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); see also
United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 304 (1987) (upholding the warrantless use
of a flashlight to illuminate the inside of a barn); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,
739-40 (1983) (upholding the warrantless use of a flashlight to view the inside
of an auto). These decisions have rested on the conclusion that searches occur-
ring in the open fields do not require a warrant. See United States v. Dunn,
480 U.S. 294, 304 (1987); Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 184 (1984); see
also United States v. Ward, 703 F.2d 1058, 1059 n.2, 1061-62 (8th Cir. 1983) (up-
holding the warrantless use of a "night scope," which "operates [at night] by
drawing upon all available sources of light to illumine the magnified image").
As discussed below, any distinction between the warrantless use of binoculars
and telescopes to view the open fields, and the warrantless use of these devices
to look into a constitutionally protected area, should be abandoned. See infra
text accompanying notes 235-44. But see United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d
131, 139 (2d Cir. 1980) (distinguishing the use of a telescope to view the open
fields from the use of a telescope to view the inside of a residence); State v.
Blacker, 52 Or. App. 1077, 1081, 630 P.2d 413, 417 (1981) (same).
196. See, e.g., United States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585, 592 (11th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987); Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432, 434
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830 (1968); United States v. Christensen, 524
F. Supp. 344, 346-48 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Johnson v. State, 2 Md. App. 300, 304, 234
A.2d 464, 467 (1967); State v. Thompson, 196 Neb. 55, 60, 241 N.W.2d 511, 515
(1976); Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. 177, 181, 263 A.2d 904, 906
(1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971); State v. Vogel, 428 N.W.2d 272, 275
(S.D. 1988); State v. Manly, 85 Wash. 2d 120, 124, 530 P.2d 306, 308 (1975), cert.
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expressed concern that although the officer technically has not
committed a physical trespass into a constitutionally protected
area, his vision has intruded into this protected area. These
courts have held that the observation of a constitutionally pro-
tected area with binoculars or a telescope requires a warrant.
The Tenth Circuit opinion in Fullbright v. United StatesL97
provides an example of a court upholding warrantless binocular
surveillance of a home or office. In Fullbright, decided shortly
after Katz,198 officers stationed in open fields used binoculars to
observe three defendants operating an illegal aldohol-producing
still inside a shed.199 While stating that a warrantless physical
search of the shed would have violated the fourth amend-
ment,20 0 the Fullbright court relied on the lack of any physical
trespass, as well as an implicit consent argument, to sustain the
warrantless binocular viewing of the shed.20 1
Some courts have upheld such warrantless binocular or tel-
escope observations, even when officers could view the sus-
pect's residence only from an inaccessible location.20 2 In
United States v. Whaley,20 3 the suspect's property was located
in secluded woods bounded by a river and a canal.20 4 By sta-
tioning themselves across the canal on neighboring property,
officers could view the suspect's uncurtained basement with
binoculars. After three months of such warrantless observa-
denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975); see also United States v. Grimes, 426 F.2d 706, 708
(5th Cir. 1970) (upholding the warrantless use of binoculars to spot the defend-
ant placing six gallons of untaxed whiskey in his car).
197. 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 870 (1968).
198. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). For a brief discussion of the
Katz decision, see supra text accompanying notes 84-90.
199. Fullbright, 392 F.2d at 433.
200. Id. at 434.
201. When the investigators made their initial observation, the door to the
shed was open and its light was sufficient to reveal what was going on. "The
extent of the investigators' action at the time was to look.... [O]bservations
from outside the curtilage of activities within are not generally interdicted by
the Constitution." Id
202. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 196 Neb. 55, 60, 241 N.W.2d 511, 515 (1976)
(upholding officers' use of binoculars to view the suspect "from a little-used
alley" by looking through the sheer curtains covering an apartment window);
Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. 177, 181, 263 A.2d 904, 906 (1970)
(upholding legality of FBI agent peering into defendant's print shop with bin-
oculars by standing on a four-foot high ladder mounted on abutting railroad
tracks), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 914 (1971); Johnson v. State, 2 Md. App. 300, 304,
234 A.2d 464, 467 (1967) (upholding officers' use of binoculars to peer through
a window of the suspect's home).
203. 779 F.2d 585 (11th Cir. 1986), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987).
204. Id, at 587.
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tion, the officers arrested the suspect, charging him with co-
caine manufacture and distribution. The Whaley court upheld
the warrantless search, writing that an unenhanced "plain
view" could have revealed the same evidence as the binocular
surveillance.20
5
In contrast to decisions such as Fullbright and Whaley,
some lower courts have concluded that the viewing of a resi-
dence or an office with binoculars or a telescope requires a war-
rant.206 In United States v. Taborda,207 a cocaine processing
operation established in an apartment was observed by Drug
Enforcement Administration agents from an apartment located
across the street. The agents viewed the cocaine laboratory
both with their unenhanced vision and with a "high-powered
telescope. '20 8 The Taborda court held that the unenhanced
viewing was a permissible warrantless search, but that the use
of a telescope without a warrant violated the fourth
amendment.209
A federal district court reached a similar result in United
States v. Kim.210 In Kim, FBI agents using warrantless tele-
scope and binocular surveillance from two different locations
observed an illegal gambling operation conducted in the de-
fendant's apartment.211 The Kim court held that this warrant-
less telescope and binocular surveillance was unconstitutional.
The court asserted that such surveillance "can intrude on indi-
vidual privacy as severely" as the warrantless wiretapping
banned by the Supreme Court in Katz. 212 The Kim court also
rejected the government's contentions that the surveillance was
analogous to a search falling within the "plain view" exception,
and that the defendant implicitly consented to the search by
205. Id. at 590-92. Judge Bryan Simpson dissented, concluding: "The view
obtained was poles apart from a constitutional plain view and not preclusive of
a reasonable expectation of privacy." Id. at 592.
206. See, e.g., United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138-39 (2d Cir. 1980);
United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256-57 (D. Haw. 1976); State v.
Blacker, 52 Or. App. 1077, 1081, 630 P.2d 413, 417 (1981); People v. Arno, 90
Cal. App. 3d 505, 511, 153 Cal. Rptr. 624, 627 (1979).
207. 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980).
208. Id at 134.
209. Id. at 138-39. Judge Edward Dumbauld dissented from the majority's
conclusion that the warrantless use of the telescope was unconstitutional. Id-
at 141.
210. 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976).
211. The telescope was located one-fourth mile away from the suspect's
apartment. Id. at 1254.
212. Id at 1256-57.
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leaving his curtains open.21 3
Although most courts have upheld warrantless surveillance
of a residence or office with bincoulars or a telescope,2 1 4 deci-
sions such as Taborda and Kim demonstrate that the validity of
these searches remains an open issue. Given the limited useful-
ness of Supreme Court sense-enhanced search analysis in
resolving this issue, the Court may well be forced to consider
warrantless telescope and binocular searches.
2. Fluorescent Powder
Police have used fluorescent powder, invisible to the naked
eye, as a means of connecting a suspect to incriminating evi-
dence.21 5 Investigators cover contraband or a suggestive object
with the invisible powder. After learning that someone has re-
trieved the treated object, police place a suspect's hands under
a fluorescent light. If the light discloses the presence of the flu-
orescent powder, the police may then connect the suspect to
the incriminating evidence.2 1 6
Although the Supreme Court has never ruled on the appli-
cation of the warrant clause to fluorescent powder searches, the
analysis used by the Court in other sense-enhanced search
213. ML
214. Decisions holding that police do not require a warrant to view the in-
side of a residence or office with a telescope or binoculars receive some sup-
port from recent Supreme Court decisions upholding warrantless aerial
searches. For example, the Court upheld a warrantless aerial search that em-
ployed sophisticated magnifying and photographic equipment to view an indus-
trial complex. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1986). In
refusing to find that this search violated the fourth amendment, however, the
Dow Chemical opinion continued: "[Tihe photographs here are not so re-
vealing of intimate details as to raise constitutional concerns." Id at 238; see
also Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 697 (1989) (upholding a warrantless naked-
eye observation from a helicopter of marijuana growing in the defendant's
backyard greenhouse); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213-15 (1986) (up-
holding a warrantless aerial search during which officers employed their
unenhanced vision to spot marijuana in the suspect's backyard).
In short, although the aerial search cases provide some support for the ar-
gument that telescope and binocular observations of a residence do not require
a warrant, these Supreme Court decisions do not resolve the telescope and bin-
ocular cases.
215. See generally 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 9, at 349-55 (describing cases in
which police have used fluorescent powder); Note, Police Use of Sense-Enhanc-
ing Devices, supra note 14, at 1189-94 (describing police use of fluorescent
powder).
216. The fluorescent powder search thus operates somewhat similarly to a
beeper search, discussed above. See supra text accompanying notes 8-9, 128-35.




cases suggests that a search using fluorescent powder should
not proceed without a warrant. The use of fluorescent powder
does, enhance a visual, rather than an aural sensation, and this
distinction would suggest that a warrantless use of fluorescent
powder should be permissible. The use of fluorescent powder
cannot be analogized to a plain view search, however, because
the powder is invisible to the naked eye. Nor is it readily ap-
parent how a court could find that a suspect implicitly con-
sented to a search using fluorescent powder without assuming
the Orwellian spectre that each object one touches is a poten-
tial medium of surveillance.217 Finally, the fluorescent powder
search involves a trespass of a constitutionally protected area -
the suspect's person, which police must examine with an ultra-
violet light.
Despite this suggestion that a search using fluorescent
powder should require a warrant, most lower courts have held
that the use of such powder does not require a warrant.218
These cases employ little reasoning to support their conclusion.
For example, in United States v. Richardson,2 1 9 the Sixth Cir-
cuit upheld the warrantless use of a fluorescent powder scan,
which connected burglars with two bags of coins stolen from a
bank.220 The Richardson court simply concluded: "We do not
regard the examination of appellant's hands under the ultravio-
let light as a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.' '221  The Richardson court continued that even if a
fourth amendment search had occurred, "we agree with the
finding of the District Judge that the appellant voluntarily con-
sented to it." '222
Like the Supreme Court's decisions invoking a suspect's
implicit consent,22 3 the Richardson court's conclusion that the
defendant consented to the fluorescent powder search is diffi-
217. Some lower courts considering this issue have made such a suggestion,
however. See United States v. Richardson, 388 F.2d 842, 845 (6th Cir. 1968);
People v. Santistevan, 715 P.2d 792, 795-96 (Colo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 965
(1986).
218. See, e.g., United States v. Richardson, 388 F.2d 842, 845 (6th Cir. 1968);
Williams v. City of Lancaster, 639 F. Supp. 377, 382 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Los Ange-
les Protective League v. Gates, 579 F. Supp. 36, 46 (C.D. Cal. 1984); United
States v. Millen, 338 F. Supp. 747, 753 (E.D. Wis. 1972); State v. Holzapfel, 748
P.2d 953, 956-57 (Mont. 1988); Commonwealth v. DeWitt, 226 Pa. Super. 372,
375, 314 A.2d 27, 31 (1973).
219. 388 F.2d 842 (6th Cir. 1968).
220. Id. at 843.
221. Id. at 845.
222. Id.
223. See supra text accompanying notes 173-91.
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cult to understand. Although the defendant may have agreed
at the police station to place his hands under a fluorescent
light, he obviously did not consent to the police dusting of the
coin bags with fluorescent powder, which formed a necessary
part of the search.
Other cases approving the warrantless use of fluorescent
powder have employed even more cursory reasoning. In Los
Angeles Police Protective League v. Gates,224 police used fluo-
rescent powder without a warrant in an attempt to identify of-
ficers who were committing burglaries while on duty.2 25 An
officer subsequently fired by the police department for sus-
pected unlawful conduct brought a civil rights action, alleging
that the warrantless use of the fluorescent powder was uncon-
stitutional. The Gates court upheld the fluorescent powder
search, emphasizing the state's interest in maintaining police
integrity.226
The importance of expediency is the only rationale men-
tioned by the Gates court in departing from the warrant re-
quirement.227 The court did not even attempt to bring the
fluorescent powder search within one of the exceptions to the
warrant clause recognized by the Supreme Court.
Courts that have reached a contrary conclusion, holding
that a search using fluorescent powder requires a warrant, have
not employed much more elaborate reasoning.228 In United
States v. Kenaan,229 police used fluorescent powder without a
warrant to demonstrate that the suspect had taken possession
of a package containing cocaine.230 In holding this warrantless
search unconstitutional, the First Circuit simply noted that
searches of a person typically require a warrant, and held that
this rule should apply to the use of fluorescent powder.231
224. 579 F. Supp. 36 (C.D. Cal. 1984).
225. Id. at 38-39.
226. The state, as both employer and law enforcer, had an overwhelming
interest in protecting the appearance and actuality of police integrity. Investi-
gators needed to act quickly, because the guilty officers could wash their hands
and destroy the incriminating evidence. Id. at 46.
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., United States v. Kenaan, 496 F.2d 181, 183 (1st Cir. 1974);
People v. Santistevan, 715 P.2d 792, 795-96 (Colo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 965
(1986); see also State v. Howell, 524 S.W.2d 11, 16-18 (Mo. 1975) (holding uncon-
stitutional a warrantless swab of the defendant's hands, undertaken to test for
residue particles indicating that the defendant recently had fired a gun).
229. 496 F.2d 181 (1st Cir. 1974).
230. Id. at 182.
231. Id. at 183. In remanding the case for a new trial, the Kenaan court
suggested that the warrantless search would be constitutional if this search
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A similarly brief analysis of fluorescent powder searches
appears in People v. Santistevan.232  Relying heavily on
Kenaan, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the warrantless
use of fluorescent powder violates the fourth amendment.2 33
As in Richardson, the Santistevan court stated that a suspect's
consent to an examination of his hands under ultraviolet light
would exempt a fluorescent powder search from the warrant
requirement. The Colorado Supreme Court thus remanded the
case for a finding on whether the suspect had consented to the
examination of his hands.2 34
None of the lower courts considering the use of fluorescent
powder have articulated persuasive grounds for upholding or
invalidating these warrantless searches. The constitutionality
both of warrantless fluorescent powder searches and of war-
rantless telescope and binocular searches of a residence eventu-
ally may require a decision by the Supreme Court. In the
interim, police and the lower courts will continue to struggle
with these issues.
C. SUMMARY
The Supreme Court primarily has considered four factors
to determine whether a particular type of sense-enhanced
search requires a warrant: 1) Whether the search involves a
physical trespass, and thus requires a warrant; 2) Whether the
search enhances aural sensations, and thereby requires a war-
rant, or enhances visual sensations, and thus does not require a
warrant; 3) Whether the search discloses information available
to an officer's "plain view," and thus is exempt from the war-
rant requirement; and 4) Whether the suspect implicitly con-
sented to the search, and thereby renders the warrant
requirement inapplicable. The artificial nature of these distinc-
tions has resulted in the apparently arbitrary and ad hoc qual-
ity of decisions applying the warrant clause to sense-enhanced
searches. The lack of guidance provided by these Court opin-
ions has in turn generated conclusory and conflicting lower
court decisions.
fell within the warrant clause exception for searches incident to an arrest. Id
See, e.g., United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Chimel v. California,
395 U.S. 752, 760-63 (1969).
232. 715 P.2d 792 (Colo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 965 (1986).
233. Id. at 795.
234. Id. at 795-96; see also Williams v. City of Lancaster, 639 F. Supp. 377,
382 n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1986) (discussing the "possibility" of a suspect's consent to a
screening for fluorescent powder).
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The four criteria relied on by the Supreme Court do not re-
spond to the fourth amendment concerns identified in Part I of
this Article.235 Accordingly, the Court's distinctions in no way
ensure that those sense-enhanced search techniques raising the
most serious fourth amendment concerns will receive the prior
review of the warrant process.
In light of the inadequacy of the Court's sense-enhanced
search distinctions, the third part of this Article considers alter-
native factors for determining whether various types of sense-
enhanced searches should require a warrant. This section will
identify factors that could produce a more coherent warrant re-
quirement, consistent with the fourth amendment concerns
identified in Part I.
III. A SUGGESTED APPLICATION OF THE WARRANT
CLAUSE TO SENSE-ENHANCED SEARCHES
The following section suggests that courts should balance
three factors in determining whether a particular type of sense-
enhanced search requires a warrant. The three suggested fac-
tors are: 1) The specificity of the information revealed by the
sense-enhanced search, 2) The limited duration of the sense-en-
hanced search, and 3) The extent to which the sense-enhanced
search requires officers to focus on a particular individual.
This approach would require police to obtain a warrant
before employing those sense-enhanced searches most suscepti-
ble to abuse. A search that revealed broad information, al-
lowed for surveillance of a large number of individuals, and
lasted indefinitely would facilitate abuse more readily than a
brief search that provided police with only a narrow type of in-
formation about an individual suspect.
This section uses the three factors listed above to evaluate
Supreme Court decisions that apply the warrant requirement
to sense-enhanced searches. This section also considers the lim-
itations of a warrant clause analysis based on these three fac-
tors. Under the suggested approach, the Supreme Court would
balance the above three factors to develop rules that would de-
termine the necessity of a warrant prior to any particular type
of sense-enhanced search. The Court would engage in "defini-
tional" or "categorical" balancing, and thus weigh the three fac-
tors to obtain a bright-line rule. Accordingly, the Court would
reject an ad hoc balancing approach, which would require
235. See supra text accompanying notes 16-79.
1990]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
courts to determine the reasonableness of each case in which a
sense-enhanced search was used without a warrant.23 6
The appropriateness of constitutional interpretation
through categorical versus ad hoc balancing has received exten-
sive discussion.237 In interpreting the fourth amendment, the
Court has at times followed each approach.238 Nonetheless, the
236. On the distinction between categorical and ad hoc balancing, see gen-
erally G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1055-56 (11th ed. 1985) (explaining
use of definitional balancing in first amendment cases); Aleinikoff, Constitu-
tional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J. 943, 978-80 (1987) (asserting
that the distinction between definitional balancing and ad hoc balancing is ar-
tificial); Henkin, Infallibility Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78
COLUM. L. REv. 1022, 1047-48 (1978) (discussing appeal and dangers of balanc-
ing); Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment The-
ory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 935, 935-48
(1968) (examining use of balancing in first amendment cases).
237. Aleinikoff, supra note 236, at 979 (stating that "definitional balancing
does not prove to be a panacea. Any gain in certainty it provides comes at the
price of reduced coherence."); Strossen, The Fourth Amendment in the Bal-
ance: Accurately Setting the Scales Through the Least Intrusive Alternative
Analysis, 63 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1173, 1175-76 (1988) (asserting that "fourth amend-
ment rights, like other constitutionally guaranteed individual liberties, should
receive the more certain protection resulting from categorical rules rather
than the less certain protection resulting from ad hoc balancing"); Wasser-
strom & Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO.
L.J. 19, 44-50 (1988).
238. The Court occasionally has embraced such a categorical balancing ap-
proach in applying the warrant requirement to some types of sense-enhanced
searches. For example, the Court has held that all wiretaps require a warrant.
See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 64
(1967). At least to date, the Court has not required a warrant prior to any ae-
rial search. See Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696-97 (1989); Dow Chem. Co.
v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207,
215 (1986).
In other cases, however, the Court has not adopted such bright-line rules.
For example, the Court has required a warrant before police may conduct
beeper searches in some cases, but not in others. United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 718 (1984) (holding unconstitutional warrantless monitoring of a
beeper located in a residence); cf United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285
(1983) (permitting warrantless monitoring of a beeper that traveled on public
streets).
The Court's recent fourth amendment decisions have suggested an in-
creasing reliance on ad hoc balancing. In these decisions, the Court has not
promulgated general rules on the applicability of the warrant clause, but in-
stead has evaluated warrantless searches on a case-by-case basis. See Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1419 (1989) (upholding
warrantless blood and urine tests of railway workers, "[tihough some of the
privacy interests implicated by the toxicological testing at issue reasonably
might be viewed as significant in other contexts"); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 342 (1985) (permitting warrantless search of a high school student by
a teacher or administrator "when the measures adopted are reasonably related
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bright-line rules developed through categorical balancing, and
the guidance provided by these rules to police and lower courts,
appear preferable in fourth amendment cases to the ephemeral
standards produced by ad hoc balancing.2 3 9
Determining which factors the Court should consider in
deciding when the warrant clause applies should prove at least
as important as the choice of a categorical or ad hoc balancing
approach. The three factors suggested in this Article - the
specificity of information revealed by a sense-enhanced search,
the duration of the search, and the extent to which the search
requires officers to focus on a particular individual - respond
directly to the fourth amendment concerns identified in Part
J.240
Conversely, the factors relied on by the Supreme Court in
applying the warrant clause to sense-enhanced searches bear
to the objectives of the search and not excessively intrusive in light of the age
and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction").
239. Categorical balancing is particularly appropriate in determining the
appropriate application of the fourth amendment warrant clause. In any par-
ticular case, a police officer who typically possesses little or no legal training
will make the decision whether to apply for a warrant. In addition, officers
seeking evidence of criminal activity often must act quickly, and rarely will
have the opportunity to ponder the reasonableness of a warrantless search at
their leisure. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-82 (1984); Strossen,
supra note 236, at 1193-94; Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 237, at 48.
An incorrect fourth amendment decision by investigating officers may re-
sult in severe consequences. If a court subsequently determines that an of-
ficer's failure to obtain a warrant violated the fourth amendment, evidence
obtained in the warrantless search might be excluded from any criminal trial,
and an individual who clearly committed a crime may be allowed to go free.
See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648-50 (1961); see also Burkoff, Bad Faith
Searches, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 70, 84-122 (1982) (discussing relevance of police of-
ficer's subjective intent); cf. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984)
(finding that "physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying on a war-
rant.., should be admissible"). Such results not only will reintroduce danger-
ous criminals into society, but also may encourage contempt for fourth
amendment rules among law enforcement officers. United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 907-08 (1984) (noting that guilty defendants may go free, resulting in
disrespect for the law); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 486-87 (1976) (explaining
that application of the exclusionary rule is restricted to areas in which police
misconduct will be deterred).
Because of the serious consequences resulting from incorrect law enforce-
ment decisions, lower courts may prove reluctant to find a warrantless police
search unreasonable and unconstitutional. The absence of the bright-line
rules provided by categorical balancing thus may result in a failure by lower
courts to enforce the fourth amendment. See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at
393-94; Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Princi-
pled Basis" Rather Than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REV.
565, 649-50 (1983).
240. See supra text accompanying notes 16-79.
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little relationship to the fourth amendment concerns raised by
such searches. Even if the Court developed a categorical test
using one of these factors, such as the presence or absence of a
physical trespass, this rule might not prevent the warrantless
use of sense-enhanced devices raising the most serious fourth
amendment concerns.241
Contrary to current Supreme Court analysis,2 4 2 the ap-
proach developed in this section would provide that the location
where a sense-enhanced search is initiated would have no bear-
ing on whether police must obtain a warrant. As discussed
above, the presence or absence of a physical trespass is of little
relevance in analyzing sense-enhanced searches.243 The power
of sense-enhancing devices often will allow police to gain infor-
mation about activities occurring in a constitutionally-protected
area, even when the sense-enhancing device is located outside
of this area.244 In addition, sense-enhanced searches not requir-
ing a physical trespass actually may raise particularly serious
fourth amendment concerns, because police more easily may
preserve the secrecy of searches that do not require a physical
entry onto a suspect's property.245
241. For much of the twentieth century, the Court applied a categorical
rule that only searches involving a police trespass of a constitutionally pro-
tected area could require a warrant. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 466 (1928); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924). The Court aban-
doned this categorical rule in 1967, holding that the warrantless wiretapping of
a telephone in a public telephone booth violated the fourth amendment even
though this search did not involve a physical trespass of a constitutionally pro-
tected area. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); see also supra note
85 (listing sources addressing the rule that only searches involving physical
trespass into a constitutionally protected area require a warrant). On the con-
tinuing importance of the physical trespass doctrine in fourth amendment law,
and the weaknesses of this doctrine, see supra text accompanying notes 84-114.
242. See supra text accompanying notes 84-114.
243. See supra text accompanying notes 101-14.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 101-04.
245. The approach suggested in this Article is not necessarily inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's holdings that physical searches conducted in the
open fields do not require a warrant. See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170,
184 (1984); Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57, 59 (1924); see also supra note
90 (describing Oliver). Physical searches, such as those involved in Oliver and
Hester, inherently are confined to the open fields where investigating officers
are located. Sense-enhancing devices used in the open fields, however, may
transcend this location and invade constitutionally protected areas, such as
homes or offices. The Court's proscription of the warrantless wiretapping of a
public telephone indicates that some searches occurring in public places re-
quire a warrant. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); cf. United
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) (upholding use of a flashlight in the
open fields to illuminate the interior of a nearby barn).
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A. A SUGGESTED THREE-PART BALANCING TEST
1. Specificity of Information
As a first factor for evaluating the appropriateness of a
warrantless sense-enhanced search, the Court should focus on
the breadth of the information conveyed by a particular type of
search. This factor responds to the concern that a sense-en-
hanced search may approximate a search pursuant to a general
warrant, which the framers of the fourth amendment sought to
proscribe. 246 By approving the warrantless use of only those
sense-enhanced search techniques that provide police with a
limited and specific type of information, the Court can mini-
mize the danger that police will engage in unbridled surveil-
lance of an individual's private life.247 Allowing police to
conduct only narrowly-focused searches without a warrant also
might induce police to choose these forms of investigation,
rather than broader and more intrusive search techniques that
would require a warrant.248
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1986 (Title III) underscores the importance of ensuring
that warrantless sense-enhanced searches gather only a specific
type of information.249 Title III, enacted in response to
Supreme Court decisions proscribing warrantless wiretaps,2 5°
provides standards for the issuance of warrants authorizing
wiretaps. The Title III application for a telephone intercept
warrant must include, among other things, both "details as to
the particular offense that has been, is being, or is about to be
committed," and "a particular description of the type of com-
munications sought to be intercepted. '251
246. See supra text accompanying notes 44-58.
247. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 122 (1984) (upholding war-
rantless use of a chemical test that "could disclose only one fact previously un-
known to the agent - whether or not a suspicious white powder was cocaine.
It could tell him nothing more, not even whether the substance was sugar or
talcum powder."); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968) (holding that "a search
which is reasonable at its inception may violate the Fourth Amendment by
virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope"); Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 411;
Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, supra note
3, at 282-83.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 101-14.
249. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1988).
250. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967); Berger v. New York,
388 U.S. 41, 64 (1967).
251. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (1988).
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2. Limited Duration of the Search
A second factor for evaluating a warrantless sense-en-
hanced search would favor those search techniques that provide
information for only a limited period of time.252 If a certain
type of sense-enhanced search is able to function only briefly,
the search necessarily will convey more limited information
than a similar search that continues for a more lengthy dura-
tion.253 One can envision search techniques as replicating
either a photograph, at one extreme, or a movie, at the other.
Search techniques analogous to a photograph will provide po-
lice with discrete information about the activities of a suspect at
only one isolated moment. At the other extreme, search tech-
niques analogous to a movie will provide police with a rela-
tively complete profile of a suspect and his associates over an
extended period of time.2-
Title III explicitly recognizes the policy that searches
should continue for only a limited period of time.255 In apply-
ing for a telephone intercept warrant under Title III, federal of-
ficers must include "a statement of the period of time for which
the interception is required to be maintained. ''25 6
3. Focus on Particular Individuals
As discussed in Section I, police surveillance of third par-
ties not independently suspected of engaging in criminal activ-
ity constitutes a serious fourth amendment concern. 257 In
252. See Butterfoss, As Time Goes By: The Elimination of Contemporane-
ity and Brevity as Factors in Search and Seizure Cases, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 601, 604 (1986) (stating that "[tihe Supreme Court has long recognized
that if special circumstances necessitate creating an exception to the general
rule requiring a warrant, the resulting search or seizure must occur only at
the time in which those circumstances are present, and must be as short as
possible in duration"); Granholm, supra note 17, at 711; Note, Electronic Vis-
ual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment, supra note 3, at 283-84; Note,
Tracking Katz, supra note 18, at 1488 (stating that "[s]earches permitted as
minimal intrusions have ordinarily involved brief physical examinations simi-
lar to those that might arguably be expected from the public at large. By con-
trast, an attached beeper represents a lengthy physical intrusion that
appropriates an item for an unintended use."); Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts,
supra note 13, at 326.
253. See 1 W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 500 (stating that "it is the breadth
of the intrusion rather than its depth at any particular instant in time which is
most threatening to privacy").
254. See Note, Tracking Katz, supra note 18, at 1494.
255. See supra text accompanying notes 247-49.
256. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(d) (1988).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 59-79.
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determining the propriety of a warrantless sense-enhanced
search, courts thus should consider whether a search technique
requires police to focus on a particular suspect.2 58
Search techniques that provide police with information on
previously unknown third-parties are particularly susceptible
to abuse. Police may use these techniques in high-crime areas
to engage in a virtual fishing expedition, observing everyone
who wanders into the wide net cast by the sense-enhanced
search.259
Using this factor, courts should favor search techniques
that allow police to focus on a single suspect. For example, in
conducting an aerial search, even the most conscientious officer
cannot limit her view to a single parcel of land.260 Some types
of sense-enhanced searches, such as aerial searches, thus inher-
ently result in random or arbitrary police surveillance, not jus-
tified by any prior suspicion of criminal activity.2 61 Courts
typically should require a warrant before conducting such
searches.
B. APPLICATION OF THE TEST
The following section applies the three-factor test to vari-
ous types of sense-enhanced searches considered by the
Supreme Court and the lower courts. Some Supreme Court
cases would be decided similarly under the proposed tests, such
as the Court's opinion allowing warrantless canine sniffs.262
This Article asserts, however, that other Court decisions are in-
correct, such as decisions upholding warrantless aerial
surveillance.263
258. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (upholding warrant-
less searches of the desks of government employees when an employer pos-
sesses "individualized suspicion" of misconduct); United States v. Jacobsen, 466
U.S. 109, 140 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that police
may use certain sense-enhancing devices "randomly," rather than "selec-
tively"); cf. Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402, 1422
(1989) (upholding warrantless drug testing of railway employees, even without
individualized suspicion of misconduct).
259. See Amsterdam, supra note 1, at 405 (discussing abusive police conduct
of warrantless "investigative 'stops'" in high-crime areas).
260. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
261. See Granholm, supra note 17, at 687-91 (discussing the installation of
video cameras in high-crime areas, which record all activities occurring on the
public streets).
262. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 710 (1983).
263. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696-97 (1989); Dow Chem. Co. v. United




The Court's decision upholding warrantless use of drug-de-
tecting dogs in United States v. Place264 appears clearly correct
under the three-factor analysis. Canine sniffs do not require
police to focus on a particular individual, and thus implicate the
third factor discussed above. Police easily could rove through
an airport terminal with a drug-detecting dog, or require each
person passing by a checkpoint to submit to a canine sniff.
Canine sniffs, however, reveal only very limited and spe-
cific information about an individual. Police will learn from
the dog whether a suspect is carrying a certain type of contra-
band, and that is all the officers will learn.265 In addition, ca-
nine sniffs only last for a very short duration.266 At a certain
point, the investigator will lead the dog to the suspected loca-
tion of illegal drugs or other contraband. The dog will sniff the
location, and indicate whether the contraband is present. And
then the search ends.
These positive aspects of canine sniffs support the Place de-
cision upholding the warrantless use of drug-detecting dogs.267
2. Wiretaps and "Wired" Informants
The Court's decisions requiring a warrant prior to the in-
stallation of a wiretap also appear correct under this analysis. 26 8
Admittedly, wiretaps require police to focus somewhat on a
particular individual. Prior to placing a wiretap, police must at
least determine whose phone they wish to tap. The wiretap
will allow police to listen to conversations that include both the
suspect and third parties. The simple requirement that police
determine the subject of a wiretap in advance, however, will
place some limits on the unrestricted and abusive use of this
technique.
Nonetheless, wiretaps raise very serious concerns under
the first two factors discussed above. Wiretaps do not yield spe-
cific information, but instead require police to inspect a variety
of information. In evaluating information revealed by the wire-
264. 462 U.S. 696, 710 (1983).
265. Tomkovicz, supra note 29, at 722.
266. Comment, Law Enforcement Use of High Technology, supra note 1, at
84 n.13; Note, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices, supra note 14, at 1199.
267. See Loewy, supra note 42, at 1246.
268. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972);




tap, police will have no choice but to sift through all of the sus-
pect's communications in search of conversations revealing
criminal activity.
In addition, police may use a wiretap to monitor a suspect's
calls for a lengthy period of time. The wiretap necessarily ends
only when a suspect changes his phone number.269 Through a
regular review of a suspect's phone conversations over such an
extended period, police may develop an extraordinarily detailed
portrait of the suspect's private life. In short, wiretaps impli-
cate significant fourth amendment concerns, and the Court was
correct to prohibit warrantless wiretaps.2 7 0
The same factors that support the prohibition on warrant-
less wiretaps also support a prohibition on the warrantless use
of a recording device planted on an informant.271 Like the
wiretap, the use of a "wired" informant also forces police to fo-
cus on a particular suspect. Unlike the wiretap, the use of a
"wired" informant cannot last for an indefinite duration. At
some point, the informant must withdraw from his conversa-
tion with the suspect.
Repeated use of the recorder is possible, however, although
such use will require subsequent rewiring and monitoring of
the informant. Moreover, the concealed recorder may retain
extensive conversations on a variety of topics.2 7 2 Although the
informant may attempt to restrict his conversation with a sus-
pect to crime-related subjects, the informant cannot prevent a
suspect from conversing on a broad range of matters.27 3 In
269. United States District Court, 407 U.S. at 325 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(describing one wiretap that "lasted for 14 months and monitored over 900
conversations"); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 606-07 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410 F. Supp.
144, 147-48 (D.D.C. 1976); see also Harrison, Alleged Wiretap Scheme in Cin-
cinnati, L.A. Times, Jan. 14, 1989, at 1, col. 1 (reporting on alleged wiretapping
by police and telephone company).
270. The Court's decision requiring police to obtain a warrant before in-
stalling a "spike mike" listening device in the wall of a residence appears cor-
rect for the same reason. See Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512
(1961).
271. United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 762 (1971); Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 440 (1963); cf Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985) (con-
cluding that use of a body wire transmitter by undercover informant violated
the sixth amendment); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (ex-
cluding evidence obtained from a concealed radio transmitter, used to record
the defendant's conversations after his indictment and without his counsel
present).
272. See Loewy, supra note 42, at 1253-54.
273. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 164-66 (discussing the attempts of a wired in-
formant to focus a suspect's conversation on incriminating activities).
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short, the Court's decision to allow the warrantless use of a re-
cording device concealed on an informant is incorrect under the
proposed test.27 4
3. Aerial Searches
The Court also would decide warrantless aerial search
cases differently under the proposed test.2 7 5 The duration of an
individual overflight is limited by the length of time that a
plane may remain airborne. Although the inquisitive officer
may soon return to the air, police will require continued appro-
priations of money and manpower to undertake repeated aerial
searches.
The breadth of information that police may obtain through
aerial surveillance, however, is virtually unlimited. Aerial
searches throw open all of a suspect's outdoor property for po-
lice observation. Officers scanning a suspect's land from the air
may no more limit their survey to unlawful activity than police
listening to a wiretap can limit their review to a suspect's in-
criminating conversations.27 6
Nor do aerial searches require police to focus on any partic-
ular suspect. Police flying over an area may survey entire cities
or neighborhoods falling within the officers' field of vision. Po-
lice undertaking aerial surveillance cannot limit their vision to
a particular parcel of land. Aerial surveillance does not simply
fail to require that police focus on a particular subject - this
type of search prevents such a police focus. For all of these rea-
sons, the Court should require a warrant prior to searches con-
ducted from an airplane or helicopter.
4. Resolving Lower Court Conflicts: The Binocular and
Fluorescent Powder Cases
Use of the three-factor balancing test described above also
would yield clear results both in the telescope and binocular
cases, and in the fluorescent powder cases that have divided the
lower courts.277 Under this test, the warrantless use of a tele-
scope or binoculars to peer into a protected area would be un-
274. See J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 39, at 233-35; Amsterdam, supra note 1,
at 406-08; Bacigal, supra note 35, at 553-54.
275. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696-97 (1989); Dow Chem. Co. v. United
States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).
276. See People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal. 3d 1302, 1329-30, 729 P.2d 166, 184, 233
Cal. Rptr. 2, 19-20 (1986) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
277. See supra text accompanying notes 192-232.
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constitutional.278 Binocular and telescope observation do not
provide only a specific type of information, and need not be
confined to a particular individual. Instead, police can use
these devices to view a range of individuals and activities from
a single location. Furthermore, binocular and telescope surveil-
lance can continue for an indefinite period of time.2 7 9
In contrast, the approach suggested in this Article would
permit the use of fluorescent powder without a warrant. The
use of this powder will reveal only a narrow type of informa-
tion - whether the suspect has come in contact with certain
evidence. The process of scanning the suspect's hands with a
fluorescent light will force police to focus on a particular indi-
vidual, and because the fluorescent powder will soon wash off
of the suspect's hands, the duration of such a search is strictly
limited.28 0
5. Two Difficult Cases: Beepers and Pen Registers
Supreme Court decisions upholding the warrantless use of
a pen register in virtually all circumstances, 28 1 and the warrant-
less use of a beeper in some circumstances, 28 2 present much
closer questions than the search techniques considered above.
Police using these search techniques must to some extent
focus on a particular individual in determining where to install
the beeper or pen register. This need to focus the search sup-
ports the Court's refusal to require a warrant prior to all uses
of a pen register, and some uses of a beeper. The pen register
or beeper, however, will not merely provide police with infor-
mation about a particular suspect, but also will compile infor-
mation about individuals associating with the suspect. Police
will learn of these individuals because the pen register lists all
phone numbers called by a suspect, while the beeper informs
police of all locations visited by the suspect.
At first glance, the pen register and beeper provide rela-
278. In fact, any warrantless use of telescopes or binoculars would be un-
constitutional. See supra text accompanying notes 233-43.
279. See United States v. Whaley, 779 F.2d 585, 592 (11th Cir. 1985) (up-
holding warrantless binocular surveillance of a suspect's basement, which
lasted for three months), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1055 (1987).
280. See also I W. LAFAVE, supra note 9, at 354-55 (discussing use of ultra-
violet light as an investigative technique).
281. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979).
282. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983); cf. United States v.
Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 721 (1984) (invalidating the warrantless monitoring of a
beeper located inside a residence).
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tively specific information. Searches employing only a beeper
will inform police of locations visited by a suspect, while
searches employing only a pen register will list phone calls
made by the suspect. Nevertheless, police may use either the
list of phone numbers provided by the pen register, or the list
of locations obtained by tracking the beeper, to obtain a fairly
comprehensive portrait of a suspect's acquaintances and
activities. 28 3
In addition, police may monitor these devices for a virtu-
ally unlimited period of time. Like a wiretap, only the installa-
tion of a beeper or pen register requires any significant police
effort or expense. Once the pen register or beeper is in place,
police may continuously or intermittently monitor information
until the device fails to function. The Court's approval of war-
rantless beeper and pen register searches thus is defensible, but
the concerns raised by these techniques may justify a reevalua-
tion of decisions declining to require a warrant.
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE TEST
The suggested approach may be criticized for failing to pro-
vide a clear rule.28 4 This approach, however, should result in a
less ambiguous standard than the distinctions relied upon by
the Supreme Court.28 5 Under the approach advocated above,
courts would allow or would prohibit all warrantless uses of a
particular sense-enhanced search technique. Courts would not
draw fine distinctions based on the location where a sense-en-
hancing search device is used,28 6 or whether the search provides
information that an officer's "plain view" could have re-
vealed.28 7 The suggested approach would decrease the unpre-
283. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 748 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing); see also Granholm, supra note 17, at 707 (discussing the use of surveil-
lance cameras on public streets).
284. The Supreme Court often has noted the importance of providing of-
ficers with clear guidance on when they must obtain a warrant. See, e.g.,
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring); Oliver v.
United States, 466 U.S. 170, 181-82 (1984); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454,
458-60 (1981); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); see also New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 369-70 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (contend-
ing that a balancing test does not provide coherent framework for fourth
amendment analysis).
285. See supra text accompanying notes 80-191.
286. Cf supra text accompanying notes 84-114 (analyzing sense-enhanced
searches in physical trespass cases).
287. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 1500-01; cf supra text accompanying
notes 148-172 (discussing Supreme Court's plain view analogies).
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dictable and ad hoc nature of decisions applying the warrant
clause to sense-enhanced searches.
Courts would determine whether to allow the warrantless
use of any new type of sense-enhancing device, developed
through technological invention or police innovation, through
balancing the three factors outlined above. 28 8 Police and lower
courts thus would not receive precise guidance on whether a
new type of sense-enhanced search requires a warrant.
An honest answer to criticism of this approach is that no
more certain approach is feasible. A wholesale rejection of the
warrant requirement would not address the serious concerns
raised by sense-enhanced searches, as discussed in Part 1.289
The Supreme Court's willingness to allow several types of
sense-enhanced searches without a warrant forecloses a clear
rule requiring police to obtain a warrant prior to any sense-en-
hanced search.290
Requiring a warrant prior to any sense-enhanced search
not only might prove cumbersome for police, but also undesir-
able for potential suspects. For example, assume that the Court
required a warrant prior to a canine sniff. Instead of simply
leading the drug-detecting dog up to suspicious airport luggage
or individuals, police now must impound the luggage or detain
the individuals for minutes or hours while processing a warrant
application. Police might not seek a warrant merely authoriz-
ing a canine sniff, but instead might obtain a warrant authoriz-
ing a broad physical search of an individual's clothing or
possessions. 2 91 Individuals affected by these practices might
well favor the warrantless canine sniff as an alternative.2 92
In addition to the absence of a clear, bright-line rule, the
suggested approach might be criticized as unduly restricting the
use of sense-enhanced search techniques. Many writers, includ-
ing some Supreme Court Justices, have lauded the value of
sense-enhanced searches in police work, and have attacked sug-
288. Some uncertainty will accompany any test that requires a balancing of
multiple factors. Henkin, supra note 236, at 1048; Strossen, supra note 237, at
1184-85; Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 237, at 48.
289. See supra notes 16-79 and accompanying text.
290. Cf. Bradley, supra note 4, at 1491-98 (suggesting a fourth amendment
model that would require a warrant prior to almost every search).
291. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 548-49 (1980) (describ-
ing police discovery of heroin on a suspect's person after the police detained
her at Detroit Metropolitan Airport and asked her to participate in a strip
search).
292. See Loewy, supra note 42, at 1245-48.
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gestions limiting the use of such searches.293 These Justices
and commentators have asserted that sense-enhancing search
techniques allow police to gather accurate information of un-
lawful activity without an extensive use of limited police man-
power, or the danger to individual officers that may accompany
a traditional physical search.294
Police convenience, however, does not determine the
fourth amendment validity of a practice, a rule that the Court
has reiterated on a number of occasions.295 The fourth amend-
ment is designed to protect individuals from unreasonable po-
293. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) (noting the accu-
rate observation of marijuana cultivation from an airplane, made "in a physi-
cally nonintrusive manner"); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 186 (1985)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (objecting to the suppression of "highly probative
and reliable evidence," obtained by the use of a recording device concealed on
an informant); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983) (upholding a
warrantless canine sniff); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 753 (1971) (up-
holding the warrantless use of a recorder concealed on an informant, and not-
ing that such a recorder is likely to produce "relevant and probative evidence
which is also accurate and reliable"); see also Fishman, supra note 13, at 305
(discussing the usefulness of beeper searches).
By contrast, proponents of sense-enhanced searches at times may exagger-
ate the effectiveness of such practices. See Granholm, supra note 17, at 687-88
(discussing the ineffectiveness of surveillance cameras installed on the public
streets of several cities); Hufstedler, supra note 31, at 1518 (stating that "[w]e
have the illusion that electronic surveillance is effective because the only cases
we ever see are those in which some kind of incriminating evidence is ulti-
mately produced. The innocent victims... may never find out that the causes
of their distress were invisible searches and, even if they later learn the cause,
no redress is available."); Uviller, supra note 173, at 1199.
294. For example, consider police investigation of an individual suspected
of growing marijuana on her extensive and rugged property. In a traditional
physical search, police must slowly traverse the property. If the property actu-
ally is used to grow marijuana, police will fear concealed and dangerous traps
designed to prevent discovery or poaching of the crop. See, e.g., United States
v. Bernard, 757 F.2d 1439, 1441 (4th Cir. 1985); Carter v. United States, 729 F.2d
935, 937 (8th Cir. 1984). If the police are wrong about the suspect's status as a
marijuana grower, police may spend a great deal of time and find absolutely
nothing.
Instead, police may survey this property in an aerial search. The search
will involve no danger to police. If the police are wrong about the use of the
parcel as a marijuana field, they will learn of their error in a matter of min-
utes. See Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts, supra note 13, at 331.
295. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983) (stating that "[w]e
have never equated police efficiency with unconstitutionality, and we decline
to do so now"); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978); Almeida-Sanchez v.
United States, 413 U.S. 266, 283 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring) (asserting that
"inconvenience alone has never been thought to be an adequate reason for ab-
rogating the warrant requirement"); United States v. United States Dist.
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972); see aso Tomkovicz, Beyond Secrecy for Se-
crecy's Sake, supra note 29, at 660 (explaining the influence of the efficacy fac-
[Vol. 74:563
SENSE-ENHANCED SEARCHES
lice practices, which officers may have undertaken precisely
because they are efficient.296 If police expedience determined
the extent of fourth amendment protections, police could use
the vaguest suspicions as an excuse for ransacking any resi-
dence. This obviously is not the law.
Perhaps a more persuasive response to law enforcement
concerns is that the suggested approach is not a wholesale ban
on sense-enhanced searches.297 Instead, this approach merely
mandates that police should not consummate certain types of
sense-enhanced searches without first obtaining a warrant.298
The warrant application process may involve some paperwork
and delay, but the difficulty of obtaining a warrant should not
be overstated.299 As discussed above, the process of applying
for a warrant will help convince police to abandon searches
that had no legitimate justification in the first place.300
CONCLUSION
Since the 1967 Katz decision, the Court has authored at
least nine major decisions applying the warrant clause to vari-
ous types of sense-enhanced searches.30 1 As these decisions
continue to accumulate, the Court may prove increasingly re-
tor in Court decisions); Note, Tying Privacy in Knotts, supra note 13, at 316
(discussing the "efficiency" language in Knotts).
296. See Note, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment,
supra note 3, at 295-96.
297. A wholesale prohibition of those types of sense-enhanced searches
particularly susceptible to abuse, however, is not an unreasonable suggestion.
See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 333 n.14 (1972)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (suggesting an absolute prohibition on police use of
wiretaps).
298. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 719 (1984) (finding that "[i]t
requires only a casual examination of the warrant affidavit, which in relevant
respects consists of undisputed factual assertions, to conclude that the officers
could have secured the warrant [for a physical search and seizure of a drug
manufacturing laboratory] without relying on the beeper"); Note, Tying Pri-
vacy in Knotts, supra note 13, at 331.
299. See supra note 106.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 19-43; see also Bradley, supra note
4, at 1495 (explaining benefits of requiring police to apply for warrants).
301. Florida v. Riley, 109 S. Ct. 693, 696-97 (1989) (aerial search from a heli-
copter); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) (aerial search
from an airplane); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986) (same); United
States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 718 (1984) (beeper); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696, 710 (1983) (canine sniff); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285
(1983) (beeper); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745-46 (1979) (pen register);
United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972) (wiretap);
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 754 (1971) (informant concealing a tape
recorder); see also supra text accompanying notes 4-11 (describing Supreme
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luctant to re-evaluate its methods for resolving sense-enhanced
search cases.30 2 Instead, the Justices are more likely to com-
pare each new sense-enhanced search case to some technique
already considered by the Court.30 3 For example, the Court
needed only a few paragraphs to uphold warrantless surveil-
lance from a low-flying helicopter in its most recent sense-en-
hanced search decision, Florida v. Riley.304 In upholding this
warrantless aerial search for marijuana cultivation, the Riley
Court primarily relied on a prior decision that had permitted
warrantless surveillance from an airplane flying at a higher
altitude.305
Despite the Court's apparent disinclination to embark on a
significant reconsideration of its analysis and holdings in sense-
enhanced search cases, such a reconsideration is necessary. The
Court's fact-specific sense-enhanced search decisions provide
little guidance to police or lower courts. The distinctions em-
ployed by the Court in these cases are artificial and difficult to
apply. Perhaps most importantly, these distinctions bear little
relationship to the fourth amendment concerns generated by
sense-enhanced searches. A continued application of the
Court's current methods of analysis provides little assurance
that the warrant requirement will limit those searches with the
greatest potential for violating fourth amendment rights.
This Article has developed a test based on a balancing of
three relevant factors. Because these factors are linked directly
to fourth amendment concerns, application of this categorical
balancing test should produce a more coherent and appropriate
Court decisions addressing whether a particular type of sense-enhanced search
requires a warrant).
302. See Bradley, supra note 4, at 1501 (suggesting that if the Court does
not discard current fourth amendment exceptions and distinctions, "it is des-
tined to sink ever deeper into the mire of contradiction and confusion").
303. Such an unelaborated invocation of precedent has characterized other
areas of constitutional law in which the Court has published numerous and ap-
parently conflicting opinions. See Buchanan, Governmental Aid to Sectarian
Schools: A Study in Corrosive Precedents, 15 Hous. L. REV. 783, 784 (1978) (re-
viewing Court holdings on the validity of aid to religiously-affiliated schools
under the establishment clause of the first amendment).
304. 109 S. Ct. 693, 696-97 (1989).
305. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986). The aerial search in
Ciraolo was conducted from an altitude of about 1,000 feet. Id. The helicopter
used by police in Riley flew at an altitude of about 400 feet. Florida v. Riley,
109 S. Ct. 693, 694 (1989); see also Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S.
227, 239 (1986) (upholding the warrantless surveillance of an industrial com-
plex conducted from an airplane).
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warrant requirement than the distinctions employed by the
Supreme Court.
Admittedly, a fourth amendment approach that relies on
the warrant clause may not receive a warm reception from the
United States Supreme Court. In recent decisions, the Justices
have upheld a variety of warrantless searches.30 6 Nonetheless,
even if the Supreme Court proves unwilling to reconsider its
application of the fourth amendment to sense-enhanced
searches, the warrant requirement imposed by state constitu-
tions may provide appropriate protection. As discussed
above,30 7 a number of state courts already have differed with
the United States Supreme Court in applying state constitu-
tional provisions to sense-enhanced searches. 30 8
The power, effectiveness, and secrecy of sense-enhancing
devices dramatically increases the danger posed by arbitrary,
unfounded, or abusive police investigations. Nowhere is an ap-
propriate application of the warrant clause more essential to
protect the security promised by the fourth amendment.
306. See, e.g., Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 1402,
1419 (1989) (upholding warrantless blood, breath, and urine testing of railroad
workers); California v. Greenwood, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1628-29 (1988) (upholding a
warrantless search of opaque trash bags placed in front of a residence);
O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 726 (1987) (upholding warrantless searches
of the desk of a government employee); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 342
(1985) (upholding a warrantless search of a high school student by a school ad-
ministrator).
The Court's recent de-emphasis of the warrant clause runs counter to a
strong body of historical evidence, which suggests that the Framers of the
Constitution intended for most searches to require a warrant. See Grano, Re-
thinking the Fourth Amendment Warrant Requirement, 19 AIu. CRIM. L. REV.
603, 617-21 (1982).
307. See supra text accompanying note 12.
308. See Gormley, supra note 12; see also Abrahamson, Criminal Law and
State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63 TEx. L.
REV. 1141, 1165-69 (1985) (discussing various state courts' interpretations of
state constitutions).
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